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Outsourcing Sacrifice:
The Labor of Private Military Contractors
Mateo Taussig-Rubbo*

Numerous scandals arising from the United States government's increased use of armed private
military contractors have drawn attention to the contractors' legally ill-defined position. But the
complexity of the contractors' relation to various bodies of law and doctrine-including military law,
international law, state tort law, employment law, and sovereign immunity-is not the only salient
issue. The contractors are also awkwardly positioned in relation to the traditional understanding of
sacrifice, which has structured Americans' imaginings about those who kill and are killed on behalf of
the nation. In this understanding, there is a mutually constitutive relationship between citizenship and
sacrifice. This Article examines the contractors' relation to the tradition of sacrifice and finds that
they are officially excluded from it-their deaths are not included in body counts, for instance, and
they are not given medals and honors. It construes the emergence of the contractor as an effort by
U.S. officials to avoid the political liability entailed in calling a loss a sacrifice and discusses the way
in which the legal form of contract and the policy of privatization have been means through which this
is attempted. The Article then focuses on one case in which this effort ran into difficulties: the
spectacular and grotesque killing, dismembering and immolation of four Blackwater contractors in
Fallujah, Iraq. In this event, individuals who had contracted their services came to be seen as having
sacrificed for the U.S. In conclusion, the Article urges that while it is important to address the lack of
legal clarity surrounding contractors, it is also necessary to address their position in the tradition of
sacrifice and attend to the deeper issues of popular and governmental sovereignty which that tradition
articulates.

* Associate Professor, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York, J.D.
(Yale), Ph.D. (Chicago). This paper was presented at a Summer Institute for the Humanities
workshop organized by Paul Kahn and Ulrich Haltem held at Yale Law School; at a workshop
on Religion and the Social organized by Danilyn Rutherford and Hussein Agrama at the
University of Chicago; at the American Anthropological Association annual meetings as part of
a panel I co-organized on sacrifice and sovereignty; at a seminar on art and labor at University
of London, Goldsmiths College, Department of Anthropology, organized by Roger Sansi-Roca
and David Graeber; at the Center for Humanities at the Graduate Center of the City of New
York; and at a faculty workshop at the University at Buffalo Law School. I am grateful to the
participants at those events, and for comments by Bruce Ackerman, Guyora Binder, Bruce
Grant, Keith Hart, Paul Kahn, Fred Konevsky, Marshall Sahlins, Ann Stoler, Winnifred
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INTRODUCTION

"They made the ultimate sacrifice and they are missed by their
friends and families and their clients."'
-The Red Zone, private military contractor website
Killing by, and the killing of, armed private military contractors in Iraq
has drawn attention to their ill-defined legal and cultural position. Are
these contractors and their employers subject to Iraqi law, U.S. military or
criminal law, state tort law, or international law? Can they kill with
impunity? A symmetrical question arises: can they be killed with
impunity? By this I mean not whether an Iraqi who kills a contractor
would be immune from prosecution, but whether the killing of a contractor
implicates the United States government in the same way that the killing
of a U.S. soldier does-that is, as a sacrifice for the nation which officials
and the public are expected to recognize, count, and honor. Are the
contractors, in sum, both unable to commit homicide and ineligible for
sacrifice? Do the legal form of contract and the policy of privatization
serve to immunize and dissociate the United States from these forms of
liability for those who kill or are killed on its behalf?
The United States has a long tradition of honoring those who serve in its
armed forces, of recognizing their suffering and deaths as sacrifices. Part I
of this Article, "Sovereignty and Sacrifice," describes this tradition, the
significance of which extends far beyond the military, since citizenship,
the enjoyment of civil liberties, and military service have long been
profoundly intertwined. In this mutually constitutive relationship, those
who sacrificed on behalf of the nation were citizens, and citizens were
those who sacrificed for the nation. This tradition is visible at some of the
most moving sites in the American national tradition, such as at Arlington
National Cemetery, and in its most powerful political oratory, such as the
Gettysburg Address. As Paul Kahn has urged in his exploration of this
dimension of American political culture, these offer a conception of death
not as a "mere negation" of life, but as a point of transcendence. 2 Those
who by various criteria-gender, race, status as slave, and sexual
orientation, for example-have been excluded from eligibility for
sacrifice, have found that their exclusion from that part of the citizensacrifice equation has been offered as one explanation for their exclusion
from full citizenship. Those outsiders who have been able to show that
they have sacrificed through military service-for example, immigrants-

I. The Red Zone, www.psd-eod.typepad.com/dont-worrywell-protect-yo/2005/06/index.html
(last visited Dec. 26, 2008).
2.

PAuL KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 63 (2005).
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have found themselves inscribed as citizens, while citizens who refuse to
serve may, in theory, find themselves denationalized.' This Part links this
relationship between citizenship and sacrifice to a concept of popular
sovereignty-in which sovereignty is dispersed among the ephemeral but
occasionally visible "People."
Part II, "The Unsacrificeable Contractor," examines the private military
contractors' relation to this traditional linkage between citizenship and
sacrifice. Are they excluded from this form of recognition and its various
political and legal ramifications? Whether or not military privatization is
cost-effective is a complex question. 4 A far easier claim to substantiate is
that it is cost-effective in the currency of national sacrifice. Contractor
deaths are not accorded the same honors as those offered to soldiers,5 they
are not included in official body counts, etc. Moreover, since contractors
are sometimes seen as motivated by compensation in "excess" of that
offered soldiers-to borrow a word from the international law definition
of the mercenary-their conduct lacks a component of the sacrificial idea.
That is, that sacrifice as an altruistic giving of the self, even an act of love.
Thus, the provisional conclusion of Part II is that there are good reasons to
think that contractors are excluded from the American sacrificial
tradition-the contractors are akin to mercenaries, and their deaths are, for
a national audience, banal and insignificant events, not sacrifices. But as
this Part also notes, we can detect other formulations that suggest that our
national engagement with sacrifice is more complex and that the legal and
cultural designations do not exhaust our understanding of the contractors.
Contractors and U.S. officials have described contractors' deaths as
"sacrifices." Even the U.S. military has been confused in this area,
handing out (and later retracting) Purple Hearts and other medals to
contractors.
To look more deeply into this complex reality, Part III, "The Sacrifice at
Fallujah," examines a widely reported example of the difficulties entailed
in creating a group of unsacrificeable persons. Early in the U.S. war in
Iraq, in March 2004, four armed contractors employed by Blackwater
Security Consulting were ambushed and then grotesquely and
spectacularly killed, dismembered, and immolated, by hundreds of Iraqis
and insurgents in Fallujah.
For many U.S. officials and media
commentators, these acts of "desecration," as some called them, renationalized the service that had been privatized. The deaths were

3. See infra Part I and accompanying notes.
4. Laura Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under InternationalLaw, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135, 149, n.45 (2005) (writing that
"[m]ilitary privatization can perhaps be explained primarily by the promise of cutting costs," but
noting in a footnote that these "cost savings have not been conclusively demonstrated").
5. I use "soldier" as a generic term to refer to the members of the Armed Forces, such as sailors
and airmen.
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conceived as sacrifices on behalf of the United States, and becoming sites
where the nation itself became visible through violent loss. This Part asks
whether this conceptualization stems from deeply rooted ideas of popular
sovereignty, according to which sovereignty resides not in the body of the
king or the state but in the citizenry, and, in a latent sense in the body of
the individual citizen. This notion provides a pathway between an
American national audience and the suffering of the contractor, guiding
the horrified identification which many people seemed to feel and upon
which officials acted. One theme I draw out of this example is the way
that calling a loss a sacrifice can challenge ex ante legal classifications.
Although I do not present a narrowly causal argument, following the
Fallujah event we have seen numerous changes in the legal and policy
location of military contractors.
Part IV, "The Other Sovereign," follows the subsequent legal
proceedings arising from the Fallujah incident: a fraud and wrongful death
suit brought in North Carolina state court brought by the families of the
slain contractors. The contractors killed in Fallujah moved from a private
status to a public and consecrated one via their membership in the
sovereign. Their employer, Blackwater (thus far unsuccessfully) sought to
make a parallel move, claiming that it too was actually part of the
sovereign, at least in sufficient degree that it should enjoy sovereign
immunity from litigation in state or federal court. This is a different
"sovereign," to be sure, one that traces its genealogy not to an empheral
People but more typically to the Crown or international law. Thus I
organize my narrative around the juxtaposition of two conceptions of
If
sovereignty: popular sovereignty and governmental sovereignty.
contractor companies were to gain immunity, and contractor deaths were
to remain banal and not sacrificial, this would constitute an innovative
alignment, since currently the sovereign immunity of the state is cojoined
with calling deaths in its service "sacrifices." This Part ends rather anticlimactically with the dismissal of the contractors' suit from court-not
because of a finding of immunity, but because of a binding arbitration
clause in the independent contractor agreement that each contractor had
signed.
Having sketched some of the basic themes surrounding the contractors'
relation to sacrifice and their employers' efforts to assert immunity, Part
V, "The Distribution of the Capacity for Violence," takes a broader look at
the place of military service in American society. Is it our concern that the
government is able to employ force without the bodily participation of the
citizenry (without asking for their "sacrifice"), and is thereby hewing more
to the tradition and genealogy of governmental sovereignty than popular
sovereignty? Is there anything novel in this development, or is it simply
an old story in a new form? We might have the same complaint about the
increased mechanization of war (for instance, the use of drones and
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robots),6 or the (sometimes covert, sometimes illegal) use of proxy armies
such as the Hmong mercenaries in Laos, the Afghan mujihideen, or the
Nicaraguan contras, to say nothing of support for other states and their
various adventures against their own populations or external enemies. 7 In
the case of proxy armies, this too might look like an effort to "privatize"
war and outsource sacrifice. 8 Indeed, as compared to some of these
alternatives, present day contractors such as Blackwater seem virtually inhouse. In this Part, I locate the contractor in relation to the decline of the
citizen soldier, the rise of a permanent army, the advent of nuclear
weapons and the end of conscription after the Vietnam War. Drawing on
Elaine Scarry's originality reading of the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and the War Powers Clause, I look at the distribution of the
capacity for violence in the American polity and relate an increasing
centralization of that capacity to a passive conception of sacrificecitizens imaginatively if not actually participate in political violence as
potential victims, in nuclear war, for instance, or terrorist attacks. In either
case, there is very little actual call (and perhaps need) from the
government for assistance from the citizenry, as compared with the
experience of total war in the mid-twentieth century.
The Part also describes the role of Milton Friedman in the Presidential
Commission that recommended the end of the draft, in particular his
conceptualization of military service as, above all, an issue of manpower
and labor best addressed through market mechanisms. The Commission
report framed conscription as an unfair form of "in-kind" taxation, and
Friedman even described it as slavery. In a conceptualization of military
service as a matter of labor and not a sacrament, we can see important
precursors to the current emergence of military contractors.
The
Commission's discussion of the disparity between a market wage and the
compensation offered the conscript offers another way to think of the
conscript's sacrifice. They are compelled to sell at a loss-less a willing
sacrifice of the self than an act of being sacrificed.
Before proceeding further, it may provide clarification to make explicit
a few other features of my point of departure. The tradition of honoring
sacrifice may typically be associated with the power of the state-for
6. Cornelia Dean, A Soldier Taking Orders from its Ethical Judgment Center, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 2008, at DI.
7. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR, AND THE
ROOTS OF TERROR (2005) 65-66 (describing that in order to close the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, the
"CIA led a secret army of thirty thousand Hmong mercenaries against Communist guerillas .... As
opposition to the Vietnam War mounted back home, the advantages of proxy war became clear: waged
in secret, it was at the same time removed from congressional oversight, public scrutiny, and
conventional diplomacy"); id. at 178 (describing "Nixon doctrine" that "Asian boys must fight Asian
wars"); id. at 131 (describing the Afghan mujahideen as proxy for U.S. where the "point was to ensure
the direct involvement of as few Americans as possible").
8. See id. at 131 ("The overall effect was progressively to privatize the [Afghan] war on an
international basis").
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instance in the ability of officials to summon and manipulate nationalist
sentiment. This Article is focused on another dynamic, namely, the way
in which calling a loss a sacrifice functions as a form of liability for
officials. Clearly I do not examine sacrifice as a category that pertains
only to the barbaric other - such as the suicide bomber. And I do not
undertake a deconstruction of social contract theory, in which the
preservation of the individual's life is the purpose of the covenant, or of
liberal political thought, for which death is nothing but negation, as unable
to account for the actual place of sacrifice in our political order. Kahn, in
his book Putting Liberalism in Its Place, has already done this in a
profound way; he has urged that sacrifice and sovereignty must be
considered together, and that sacrifice and not contract is the most
accurate way of framing the political relationship.9 I take as a point of
departure that the U.S. government pursues not only a monopoly of
violence but also a monopoly of sacrifice - that is, control over sacralized,
transcendent loss. Having made these assumptions, what I wish to explore
in this Article are policies that avoid sacralization and sacrifice, that
unbundle the sacred and the state. More specifically, I describe a state that
uses legal form to attempt to construe certain deaths as sacrificial and
others as banal and meaningless, in relation to a given audience. I then
explore some of the difficulties that these attempts encounter as nonstate
actors employ and advance their own conceptions of sacrifice and
meaningful loss.
In using a vocabulary that has Christian (as well as Jewish and Islamic)
resonances, I do not intend to explicitly engage the question of whether
the state is actually a "religious" organization or whether I am describing a
"political theology."'" In addition to being a religious term, sacrifice is
relevant as a political and economic category; but, more interestingly, it
operates at points of contact between those larger organizing categories
(political, economic and religious).
In a more recent scandal involving Blackwater, contractors shot and
killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007. Like the Fallujah incident,
these killings have resulted in significant media and legal drama, including
Congressional hearings, lawsuits by aggrieved relatives, and an
examination of the position of the contractor. As with the contractors'
deaths, the deaths of the Iraqi civilians appears to chafe against the legal
structure initially established by the United States (and the now sovereign
Iraqi state) which designated such deaths as legally insignificant. In the
9. KAHN,supra note 2, passim.
10. For discussion of these themes, see TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR:
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 21-66 (2003); CARL SCHMITr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George Schwab trans., University of Chicago Press
2005); WINNIFRED SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005); MICHAEL
TAUSSIG, THE MAGIC OF THE STATE (1997).
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more recent case, the repressed category is not sacrifice, but homicide.
Since the attacks at Fallujah, the legal position of the contractors has
changed in important ways-and so too has the political climate. Just
months afterwards, before leaving Iraq and transferring sovereignty from
the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi government, Paul Bremer
issued Order 17 giving the contractors (Blackwater had been guarding
Bremer) immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law." In 2004 Congress
amended the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, subjecting civilian
contractors to federal criminal prosecution, including contractors working
for U.S. agencies other than the Defense Department (a 2000 amendment
already covered those employed by the Department).1 2 Two years later, in
February 2006 private contractors were recognized as part of U.S. Total
Force along with the rest of the armed services. 3 In late 2006, a defense
spending bill, with very little notice, placed contractors under military law,
the Uniform Code of Military Justice-but doubts have been raised about
exercising military jurisdiction over "civilians."' 4 Most recently, Iraq
(through the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement with the United States, and
fueled by anger at the killing of civilians in Baghdad by Blackwater in
2007) asserted jurisdiction over contractors and in early 2009 it refused to
issue Blackwater a license to operate in the country. 5 Back in the United
States, as of late 2008, several of the Blackwater workers involved in the
Baghdad shootings have been indicted for manslaughter.' 6 While the
contractors are increasingly subject to various forms of civil and military
7
jurisdiction in the United States and Iraq there remains much uncertainty.'
In the midst of these on-going developments, serious questions remain
11. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised), (June 27, 2004), available at
www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627-CPAORD 17 Status ofCoalitionRevwithAnnex_
A.pdf (Section 4.3 "Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts
performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto").
12. The law extends jurisdiction over employees of "any other Federal agency, or any provisional
authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of
Defense overseas." 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (1)(A)(i)(Il)(2004), amended by Pub. L. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811.
13. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 87 (2006), available at
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf ("The Department of Defense is the world's
largest employer, directly employing more than three million people. The Department's Total Forceits active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors-constitutes its
warfighting capability and capacity").
14. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 §552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217
(amending 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)).
15. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ ON
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES FROM IRAQ AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
ACTIVITIES DURING THEIR TEMPORARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ, Art. 12(2), Nov. 17, 2008, available at

www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SESOFA.pdf; Emesto Londofho & Qais Mizher, Iraq to Deny New
License to Blackwater Security Firm, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009 at A 12.
16. United States v. Slough, Indictment, filed Dec. 4, 2008, CR-08-360 (D.C.D.C), at,
www.news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/iraq/blackwater-indictment I208ind.html; Ginger Thompson &
James Risen, 5 Guards Face U.S. Chargesin Iraq Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008.
17. For broad discussion, including anti-Pinkerton statutes, see Michael Davidson, Ruck Up: An
Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractorson the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CON.
L.J. 233,255 (2000).
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about how best to strengthen mechanisms of legal accountability and
administrative oversight and control.' 8 While the word "contract" may
conjure up an image of a sober agreement and reciprocal exchanges, much
of the contracting-and the multiple layers of subcontracting-has been
remarkably chaotic, disjointed, opaque and sometimes corrupt. It has
often been undertaken without competitive bidding and with guaranteed
profits, and sometimes seems to blur into other transactional forms-such
as gift or even larceny.' 9 There are also broad questions about the threat
that contractors pose to democratic accountability."a A related issue, and
one which is explored in this Article, is what I discuss as the sacrificial
liability of the U.S. government. Amidst the many reforms contemplated
and critiques leveled, the sacrifice issue is latent but only rarely explicitly
addressed. 2 While the lines of legal accountability are redrawn, there is
little talk of the need to bury contractors at Arlington National Cemetery
or to insert them into the politically costly structures of honor and
recognition which played an important role in the rise of the industry in
the first instance.
One reason why it is important to focus on our language and practices of
calling certain losses "sacrifices" is that these track the government's
dependence on the citizenry, as well as our interdependence, as citizens,
upon one another. While the reasons to want to avoid this form of giving
are obvious from the point of view of the citizen, the government that
avoids it is showing its autonomy from the citizenry. Seen in this light, a
turn away from sacrifice in the U.S. political and legal order constitutes a
recalibration of relations between citizen and state. It is one that runs
parallel to the rise of a state of exception which various authors have
examined in recent years.2 2 These two developments share a common
18. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 4.
19. For a sustained argument on the underlying gift-like nature of the market and the social
contract, see Carol Rose, Giving. Trading, Thieving and Trusting: How Gifts Become Exchanges, and
(More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 315 (1992) ("The oddly anomalous category of
gift, then, seems central to exchange. Exchange may rest on gift directly: one party is left exposed to
the danger of loss, at least temporarily, and gives over her goods in trust, even without the assurance of
reciprocity. Or exchange may rest on gift indirectly: we create outside enforcement mechanisms that
enable us to take those first risky steps with some confidence, but those enforcement mechanisms, that
old Leviathan, only get started because someone gives the time and energy needed for organizing
them. Either way, the category of exchange requires the very element of unilateral generosity that
seems to make gift so strange").
20. Martha Minnow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges
Accountability, Professionalism, And Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1023 ("But even more
troubling is the possibility that by using private contractors, the government can avoid checks and
balances in a democratic system"); see also Clifford J. Rosky, Force Inc.: The Privatization of
Punishment, Policing and Military Force in LiberalStates, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 938 (2004) (for an
excellent break-down of the spectrum of accountability arguments).
21. See Jon Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic
Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1001, 1043-46 (2004) (discussing the lack of
public meaning attributed to contractors' deaths as contrasted with those of soldiers).
22. In fact, the relation between sacrifice and various elaborations of the exception are more
complicated-mainly because recent years are not best conceived of as being in the tradition of the
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theme: the independence of the government from the citizenry in one case,
and from the normal legal order in the other. In the contractor example,
both types of estrangement, from law and from the citizenry, are
potentially joined.
The Conclusion raises the question of bringing the contractors into the
national tradition of sacrifice. If contractors are to act on behalf of the
sovereign-which they are, if they are to kill and be killed in the interests
of the United States-perhaps their deaths should be seen as sacrifices.
Indeed, as I show through various examples, there are signs that this
transformation may already be underway. The Article does not endorse
this development, however, since such a recognition by policy makers
could backfire, increasing the prestige of contractors without functioning
as a form of public accountability.
1. SOVEREIGNTY AND SACRIFICE

If one dimension of sovereignty is a capacity to exercise violence with
legal impunity, how are we to understand the relation of sovereignty to
sacrifice? Designating the death of a citizen at the behest of the state a
"sacrifice" often functions as a form and rhetoric of accountability,
insisting that the loss was not (or should not have been) insignificant, but
rather something transcendent and sacred which should be honored and
recognized. Thus sacrifice might militate against sovereign impunity. At
the same time, since this "accountability" can verge on the empheral, it
might, in many instances, seem to be little more than a cynical screen for
an underlying ability to demand an offering without compensation.
In recent years, sacrifice is often discussed as the act that U.S. citizens
have not been asked to perform. While this is a time of "war," the
complete giving of the self-or its taking by the government-that had
come to characterize total war of the twentieth century is clearly absent.
exception.

For background on the exception as the "new norm," see, for example, GIORGIO
3-4, 9 (Kevin Attell trans., University of Chicago) (2005); Oren
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011 (2002). I cannot resist noting that it is the rejection by top Bush and Cheney advisors of
"acting extralegally" that is the perhaps the most interesting part of Jack Goldsmith's account, JACK
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION

GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

(2007), of his brief tenure as head of the Office of Legal Counsel. Advisors such as Alberto Gonzales
and David Addington, according to Goldsmith, rejected the "Locke-Jefferson paradigm" of
prerogative power: where the executive would take legally questionable steps (in Locke's language,
exercise prerogative) when absolutely necessary, but would then "throw himself on the mercy of
Congress and the people so that they could decide whether the emergency was severe enough to
warrant extralegal action." Id. at 81, 83. By contrast, because of the "hyper-legalization of warfare,"
according to Goldsmith, this model was "off the table." and "The President had to do what he had to
do to protect the country. And the lawyers had to find some way to make what he did legal." Id. at 81.
It is hopefully not stretching the term sacrifice too much to think that it is relevant here: that the
official who knowingly makes himself a criminal for the common good sacrifices himself for it. Slhe
hopes that the sacrifice will be not be necessary, that they will be forgiven. This seems to the civil
disobedience model of prerogative power which Judge Posner has described. RICHARD POSNER, NOT
A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 152-55 (2006).
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Sacrifice is what Americans have not been asked to do, but it does appear
frequently as the technique America's enemies employ when they martyr
themselves.23 Even so, sacrifice-or at least sacralization-is visible at
sites like "ground zero" in New York which has become a national shrine
of a kind, and in the reception of the deaths of soldiers. We can still detect
republican currents by which sacrifice and citizenship are mutually
constitutive, however attenuated or partisan these links may be.24
This Part canvases various usages of the term sacrifice, looking first at
examples from the anthropological record and the Bible and, second, at
examples from the United States. It does not purport to be comprehensive,
but rather identifies several themes that will guide our analysis of private
military contractors.
A. The Divine Sovereign
A brief review of sacrifice in the anthropological record and the Bible
serves to highlight several relevant points. First, is an idea that sacrifice
mediates and links different domains. In Marcell Mauss and Henri
Hubert's sociological gloss from the 1890s, sacrificial procedure "consists
in establishing a means of communication between the sacred and the
profane worlds through the mediation of a victim, that is, of a thing that in
the course of the ceremony is destroyed., 25 Anthropologist Claude LeviStrauss, writing in the 1950s, employed a similar idea but generalized it
beyond Mauss' sacred/profane dichotomy. "Sacrifice," he wrote, "seeks to
establish a desired connection between two initially separate domains." 26
By asserting a connection and relation of identity between distinct
objects-he was focusing on sacrifices of substitution where x is given
instead of y-it blurred distinctions, and hence meaning itself. He derided
sacrifice as, literally, nonsense.2 7 It is just the potential nonsense of
sacrifice, when in the hands of non-state actors, that is especially
interesting in our current moment. In our contractor example, these
themes are relevant: we have a policy that declares the contractors' deaths
'are insignificant, but through the violent act of destruction, the
significance of their deaths is recalibrated.
Second, we can think of sacrifice in relation to sovereignty (a point I
take up in the next section as well). As a technique of connecting the
temporal with the transcendent, sacrifice is deeply linked to sovereignty in
23.

See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, ON SUICIDE BOMBING, 43-45, 51 (2007) (criticizing the widespread

use of "sacrifice" as an analytic to describe suicide bombing.).
24.

See Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Sacred Property: Searching for Value in the 9/11 Rubble,

available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 269533 (discussing disputed status of
rubble from attacks as abandoned and as sacred).
25. HENRI HUBERT & MARCEL MAUSS, SACRIFICE: ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION 97 (W.D.Halls
trans., University of Chicago Press) (1964).
26. CLAUDE LtVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 224-28 (1966).
27. Id.
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a vast range of human societies. Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins states
that in Indo-European and Polynesian conceptions of kingship, political
authority invariably arrives from "outside" the society. The outsider status
can be literal, as when the would-be sovereign is an immigrant, a foreign
prince, or created through the commission of terrible crime, usually rape,
incest or murder, which shows that the sovereign is outside the moral and
legal order.2" Sacrifice is one common way for the foreign sovereign to
become domesticated, or the sovereign is himself killed and is reborn as a
local god.29 By taking or receiving (the ambiguity is important) offerings
from the locals, the foreign sovereign becomes bound to the local people,
and is temporarily pacified. This evokes a conception of sovereignty not
merely as a state of exception to the normal order, but also as a creative,
foundational force, a constituent power.3" Sacrifice in relations with
political authorities might be seen as on a continuum with other forms of
offering like first fruits, taxes, and tribute. 31 These are all given "up" to
the political authorities and non-human powers. This dimension of
sacrifice suggests a link to traditions of governmental sovereignty-in
which the state is an alien entity, not derivative of "the People." But it
also reaffirms that sacrifice composes part of the sovereign's dependence
on the local people.
Third, in many of the classic stories of sacrifice, there is a substitution
of the sacrificial victim at the last minute (the ram in place of Isaac; a hind
in place of Iphigenia), although this (some commentators say) is
transcended with the "new" self-sacrifice of Jesus or that of Socrates.32
Even in the "old" stories, there is an element of giving of the self-thus
with Abraham's sacrifice it is clear that Isaac's loss of life would have
been an enormous loss to Abraham, that he too is a victim. 33 And in the
"new," such as Jesus', themes of substitution are not hard to detect: he is a
lamb who suffers in place of humanity; he is the son given by the father.
28. MARSHALL SAHLINS, ISLANDS OF HISTORY 73 (1985).
29. Id. at 73 ("Initially a stranger and something of a terror, the king is absorbed and domesticated
by the indigenous people, a process that passes by way of his symbolic death and consequent rebirth as
a local god").

30.

See

Andreas

Kaylvas,

Popular

Sovereignty,

Democracy

and

Constituent

Power,

CONSTELLATIONS, 12, 2: 225 (2005).
31. See, e.g., ROSS HASSIG, TRADE, TRIBUTE, AND TRANSPORTATION: THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO (1993).
32. Many interpreters of our dominant religious traditions insist, like Weberian theorists of
modem disenchantment, that ours is a post-sacrificial era. For instance, many commentators describe
archaic shifts internal to the sacred Book from sacrifice to law in the Jewish case, or from sacrifice to
love in the Christian. See Jill Robbins, Sacrifice, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 288
(Mark Taylor ed., 1998). 1 draw on Robbins throughout this section. See also Jonathan Sheehan,
Sacrifice Before the Secular, REPRESENTATIONS
105 (Winter 2009), 12-36. [online at
HTTP://CALIBER.UCPRESS.NET/DOI/ABS/ 10.1 525/REP.2009.105.1.12]; and Robert Yelle, Rhetorics of
Law and Ritual: A Semiotic Comparison of the Law of Talion and Svnpathetic Magic, Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 69 (2001): 627-47.
33. Genesis 12:15; see MAURICE BLOCH, PREY INTO HUNTER: THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE 30 (1992).
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My point here is not to claim any particular insight into these instances,
but to mobilize them to highlight a recurrent tension between sacrifice as a
giving of the self and as a giving of the other.34 This dynamic, inherent in
many instances of sacrifice, is relevant for our purposes as the military
contractor raises the question of whether sacrifice can be performed by the
other, whether it can be "outsourced," or whether all sacrifice must be of
the self. The contractor seems to teeter on the divide between a giving of
the self and the giving of a substitute.
Fourth-and here we engage with thematics even more obviously
Judeo-Christian, but which are relevant for us-this distinction between
"old" and "new" sacrifice raises further important points: the role of ritual
and law; and the dichotomy between sacrifice and economic exchange
now conceived as "profane" and self-interested.
As for Christians,
Christ's sacrifice is also the last sacrifice-all that follow will be merely a
copy.
Sacrifice becomes an internal, interior and spiritualized act.
Spiritualization leads us to see the old sacrifice as economism, as
interested in exchange, as insincere, ritualistic and formalistic. It is ritual
sacrifice that makes the practice seem alien for modems. By rejecting
ritual, the act is seen to emanate from the self. Sacrifice, from the
perspective of this tradition, is in tension with and beyond law and ritual
since, in a typical Christian formulation, it is an act of love. Real sacrifice
is not that which is mandated by law, but is that which emanates from
within the self
These points about ritual, law and economism-and again I must insist
that I mobilize these assertions quite aware that they are caricatures-are
directly relevant to our topic. They detail a genealogy that asserts a stark
dichotomy between self-interest and sacrifice, between formalism and
sincerity, which are also the understandings of sacrifice that the
contractors confront. These seem to underlie the easy common sense
assertion that contractors, motivated by money, cannot sacrifice. Hubert
and Mauss, even while insisting on a rather rigid sacred/profane
dichotomization, did not so starkly divide sacrifice and self-interest:
"fundamentally there is perhaps no sacrifice that has not some contractual
element" and in sacrifice "disinterestedness is mingled with selfinterest."35
Each of these themes relating to sacrifice-connecting different
domains in a conceptual or legal order; a way of giving to the sovereign;
substitution of the other versus the giving of the self, a rejection of ritual,
law and economism-usefully draws our attention to important
dimensions of the narrative I wish to develop regarding contractors.

34.
35.

See PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 94 (2008).

HUBERT AND MAUSS, supra note 25, at 100.
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B. The Popular Sovereign
Given this (highly reductive) account of the divine or foreign sovereign,
we might think that sacrifice has no bearing on societies where
sovereignty and political power more generally are not perceived as divine
or foreign. Indeed, it is the core premise of political modernity that
political power is human and immanent (that "We the People" are
sovereign),3 6 not foreign and transcendent. If sacrifice is a technique that
connects one domain to another (the human and the non-human), what
about societies where there is but one domain-the human, the here and
now? Or where, even if a divine realm is recognized, it is either
considered irretrievably separate from the political realm, or the nonhuman actors cannot be reached and manipulated? Does the denial of God
or the divine King as sovereign not also entail the disappearance of the
"other" domain? And if sacrifice entails a mediation between two
domains (such as Mauss' sacred and profane), is sacrifice, then,
impossible for those who do not live in such a divided world?
Jean-Luc Nancy takes up these questions in an important article, writing
that sacrifice only makes sense in reference to an "outside," and that with
the evacuation of the divine from the political sphere, "there is no
'outside.'
The event of existence, the 'there is,' means that there is
nothing else. There is no obscurity that would be God.... Existence, in
this sense, in its proper sense, is unsacrificeable. 37 Building on Nancy,
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues that since human life, what
he calls "bare life," is now the highest value (if not the only value), there
is nothing else (God, the state, etc.) to which it can be given. But
Agamben's argument is at its most interesting when he claims that while
we cannot sacrifice life, sovereignty is that power which can take life with
impunity. That is, he urges that sovereign power describes the actor
who/which can kill without committing a sacrifice or a homicide.3 8
Sovereignty exists in a double exception from human law and divine law.
I mention Agamben because his conception of sovereign power helps
me to frame the turn by the government to contractors-the designation of
the contractor as unsacrificeable life. My suggestion is not to accept
Agamben's formulation as describing a transcendent truth of sovereignty,
but to see it as describing a specific effort to constitute actors whose death
is not a sacrifice, an effort that, as I show below, is not always successful.

36.

See, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 335-36 (2005). For a view of popular

sovereignty as a construct that serves to disable popular power, see EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING
THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 14 (1989).
37. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Unsacrificeable,79 YALE FRENCH STUD. 20-38, 37 (1991).
38. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 83 (trans. Daniel
Heller-Roazen, 1998) (writing that the "sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill
without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life [homo sacer]-that is
life which may be killed but not sacrificed-is the life that has been captured in this sphere").
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Despite Nancy and Agamben's observations, abstract concepts such the
state, nation, or country have served, and in the United States continue to
serve, as an "outside" to which the self, "existence," can be given. The
centrality of sacrifice is particularly obvious in relation to military service,
39
but perhaps extends to democratic politics more generally.
In the United States, sacrifice and citizenship have long been seen as
mutually constitutive: to forgo one is to disaggregate an ancient coupling.
Amidst the American flags and placards that immigrant protestors and
their supporters in New York City displayed in May 2006, for example,
several signs declared that the bearer had served, or had children serving
in, the U.S. Armed Forces. The signs evoke a well-worn transactional
form--those who offer their bodies in the service of the nation should be
recognized as deserving of citizenship. Indeed, it is a staple of political
rhetoric. President Bush acknowledged this logic in a speech outlining his
immigration policy following the demonstrations by immigrants:
On a visit to Bethesda Naval Hospital, Laura and I met a wounded
Marine named Guadalupe Denogean... [who] came to the United
States from Mexico when he was a boy. He spent his summers
picking crops with his family, and then he volunteered for the United
States Marine Corps as soon as he was able. During the liberation of
Iraq, Master Gunnery Sergeant Denogean was seriously injured. And
when asked if he had any requests, he made two: a promotion for the
corporal who helped rescue him, and the chance to become an
American citizen. And when this brave Marine raised his right hand,
and swore an oath to become a citizen of the country he had defended
for more than 26 years, I was honored to stand at his side.4"
In this structure, military sacrifice can elevate the outsider-the
immigrant serving in the U.S. military-closer to status of citizen. Such
honoring is often not forthcoming, but I am attempting to describe the
ground from which this is seen as a scandal. Recall that with the
contractor, the norm is that there is no recognition owed. Sacrifice is not
to be confused with all suffering and death; it captures a small subset of
losses and designates them as important and transcendent. Sacrifice of the
self is a paradigmatic technique in "making us all Americans," as

39.

See John Borneman's survey in "German Sacrifice Today," SACRIFICE AND NATIONAL

BELONGING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY GERMANY 17-21 (Marcus Funck et al. eds., 2002) (viewing

sacrifice in the simple act of voting though which "the People" are momentarily present in the act of
delegating authority to representatives); DANIELLE ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS 38-39 (2004)
(seeking to redirect our attention "beyond the battlefield to other moments of sacrifice," such as the
self-sacrifice of young daughters in the tale of Jepthah and his unnamed daughter and in the U.S. civil
rights movement, and more generally to the ways in which, in "large republics" "some citizens are
always giving things up for others"); and JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 51 (1991).

40. George W. Bush, President, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006)
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-8.html.
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President Bush said in his speech.4' It is a path to naturalization-even
posthumously, as provided by a 2003 law.42 Conversely, those who refuse
to sacrifice via military service have been denationalized, stripped of
citizenship.43
In his pre-Civil War Opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,4 Chief Justice
Taney evoked this same tradition to buttress his position that African
Americans were aliens, not citizens, by reference to their exclusion from
state militias. He cited the laws of New Hampshire as one example
according to which:
No one was permitted to be enrolled in the militia of the State, but
free white citizens... Nothing could more strongly mark the entire
repudiation of the African race. The alien is excluded, because, being
bom in a foreign country, he cannot be a member of the community
until he is naturalized. But why are the African race, born in the
State, not permitted to share in one of the highest duties of the
citizen? The answer is obvious; he is not, by the institutions and laws
of the State, numbered among its people. He forms no part of the
sovereignty of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and
defend it.
While Taney's decision was rejected by the Civil War Amendments, the
assumption of the passage cited was not. Indeed, this same structure is at
the heart of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and the Emancipation
Proclamation--except that the "state" which is receiving the sacrifice is
now the United States, not the its member states. 45 Those excluded from
military service have understandably claimed that they are losing out on
accessing the particular prestige accorded military service.4 6 What we see
in Taney and Lincoln is an intersection between the sovereign and

41.

Id.

42. Posthumous Citizenship for Active Duty Service Act, Pub. L. No. 101-249, § 2(a), 104 Stat.
94(1990).
43. Denationalization has been restricted by the Supreme Court in the post-war era, a
periodization that conforms with our standard narratives of post-war culture as not entailing much in
the way of citizen "sacrifice." See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2007) listing grounds for denationalization. See
Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories ofLoss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1481 (1986) ("Alarmed
by the eagerness with which Congress had expanded the grounds for denationalization in the 1940s
and 1950s, faced with statutes that stripped citizenship on grounds other than sorting out allegiances,
concerned about the use of denationalization as a form of punishment, and cognizant of the harms that
involuntary statelessness imposed, the Court adopted a prophylactic rule strongly protective of the
individual").
44. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1856).
45. See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation
(Jan. 1, 1863), available at www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/emancipationproclamation/transcript.htm.
46.

Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to

Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1308 (1991) ("The logic of that coupling [civil rights and
military obligations] is clear: from the earliest moments of the republic to the most recent, the concept
of the civil franchise has been inseparable from the record of military participation").
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sacrifice-the citizen dies so that the sovereign may live. It is not the
citizen who is unsacrificeable, but the sovereign. And yet Agamben's
point may be that in a government where the people are sovereign the
sovereign is not an "other," hence sacrifice has a circular character, for the
sacrificing citizen is really giving to him or herself.
While this traditional citizen/sacrifice coupling is still visible, as
suggested by President Bush's comment, it is also easy to see it as anemic
-whether it has become weak because of a "Vietnam gap" between the
military and the rest of the population, the end of conscription, or some
other reason such as a diminished need for active mass participation in
warfare. Indeed, many of the cliches about and diagnoses of American
society after World War II suggest that America is a hedonistic, selfcentered, consumer society,4 7 and that the traditional relationship of
citizenship to military service is disintegrating. One commentator notes "a
central paradox of present-day American militarism. Even as U.S. policy
in recent decades has become progressively militarized, so too has the
Vietnam-induced gap separating the U.S. military from society persisted
and perhaps even widened."48 If, on the other hand, we focus on the
shared vulnerability entailed by the existence of nuclear weapons as a kind
of conscription, we see the matter differently-the post WWII era emerges
as one in which all Americans are grasped by the potential for sacrificial
death, albeit of a passive sort.49 This seems very far from any link to
popular sovereignty-rather it seems closer to a divine or governmental
sovereignty in which the state is strikingly autonomous.
From yet another perspective, the list of those who are "allowed" to
sacrifice themselves is expanding-the revolutionary effects of the
women's and civil rights movements seems to have made some headway
against a gendered and racial conception of whose loses will garner
Thus we confront a rough but
official recognition as sacrifices.
nonetheless striking correlation between a move to more genuine civic and
political equality and the emergence of an imagined equality in death on a
national and global scale. Overall, we might think that citizenship and
military service, while long considered mutually constitutive in the United
47. See generally LIZBETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003).
48. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED

By WAR 27, 28 (2005) ("For the generations that fought the Civil War and the world wars, and even
those who served in the 1950s and 1960s, citizenship and military service remained intimately linked.
Indeed, those to whom this obligation to serve did not apply-including at various times the poor,
people of color, and women-were thereby marked as ineligible for full citizenship... In our own
time, all of that has changed.. .There is a simple explanation for this fact. As with so many other
aspects of life in contemporary America, military service has become strictly a matter of individual
choice").
49. Paul Kahn, Nuclear Weapons and the Rule of Law, 31 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 349, 355
(1999) ("These weapons rest implicitly on a policy of conscription that extends to every citizen-and
even beyond-for which no exemptions are granted").
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States, have come unraveled in numerous ways, and at the same time that
the linkage has become more universal and encompassing.
Another perspective considers not who is eligible to sacrifice but rather
who is eligible to receive the sacrifice. If a mass consumer-oriented
society is seen as corrupt, the public may seem an unworthy recipient of
sacrifice-an extremely common theme. The imagined recipient of the
sacrifice may not, in fact, be civilians, but some other group, such as the
military itself. Soldiers may imagine their sacrifice not for the country but
for their unit or their "band of brothers." Samuel Huntington, speaking of
the officer corps in a book published in the same year the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was enacted, describes a monastic military sacrificing for a
corrupt civilian population. For him, West Point is a Sparta in the "midst
of Babylon" and he opines that "today America can learn more from West
Point than West Point from America .... If the civilians permit the soldiers
to adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may eventually
find redemption and security in making that standard their own." 50 In
another, more recent version of cultural decline and resentment, it is hardworking residents of the heartland who sacrifice for "blue-state" elites, 51
while President Obama, on the campaign trail in 2008, also invoked death
for the United States as a powerful demonstration of unity: soldiers "have
fought together and bled together and some died together under the same
proud flag. They have not served a Red America or a Blue America they have served the United States of America. '"52
Thus, the picture today is quite complicated. The roles of those giving
and receiving sacrifices for the nation are not clearly defined. We can see
sacrifice invoked both as an inclusive practice, and as a burden that is not
fairly distributed. Part V engages these issues further, asking how the
advent of a standing army and an all-volunteer army affected the
traditional structure linking sacrifice and citizenship. In particular,
reflecting on the American tradition of the citizen soldier, I will
problematize the assumption, permeating my commentary thus far, that
the volunteer soldier's sacrifice in a standing army is paradigmatic. I will
explore how a standing army might itself been seen as a kind of
"outsourcing" of sacrifice. For the time being, this Part has sought to
sketch some of the relevant understandings of the relation between
citizenship, sovereignty and sacrifice.
50. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLIDER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS, 465-66 (1964).
51. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, IMPERIAL GRUNTS: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ON THE GROUND, 259-60

(2005) (narrating that the "military is part of another America," the "working class and slightly above:
that vast, forgotten multitude of America existing between the two coastal, cosmopolitan zones, which
journalists in major media" inhabit).
52. Mark Z. Barabak & Richard B. Schmitt, Barack Obama Has Advantage of Big Bucks, a Big
Name: Colin Powell, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, available at www.mobile.latimes.
com/detail.jsp?key=l 86387&rc=nation&full=.
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II.THE UNSACRIFICEABLE CONTRACTOR

Having seen that there is a link between sacrifice, sovereignty and
citizenship, this Part examines the private military contractors' relation to
this structure. Are they excluded from this form of recognition? This Part
describes three formulations as to whether the deaths of contractors hired
by companies working for the United States are seen as "sacrifices," and if
so, sacrifices for whom. In a first formulation, they are mercenaries; in a
second, they sacrifice, but this sacrifice is in the private sector and for the
client; in a third, their deaths are seen as sacrifices for the United States.
A. Mercenaries:ineligiblefor sacrifice
"[A mercenary is] motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially
by the desire for private gain... material compensation substantially
in excess of that promised or paid to combatants..
-Geneva

Convention, Protocol I"

Contractors' deaths are not sacrifices, we might think-contractors are
motivated by private gain, not national service. That is, they did not die so
that the nation might live, but because they chose a dangerous, well-paid
line of employment. They are mercenaries whose deaths do not resonate
with a broader national audience.54 We need only point out that.there is a
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, none for the Unknown Contractor.55
Arlington National Cemetery, that sacred site of the nation's military, also
does not provide for the burial of the contractor as such (veterans who are
contractors would be eligible for such an honored burial-a theme to
53. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 47(2)(c), adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
54. For an argument that contractors should often be seen as mercenaries, see Zoe Salzman,
Private Military Contractors and the Taint of Mercenary Reputation, 874- 891, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 853 (2008). Many commentators do not see contractors as mercenaries but as something new.
See Peter Singer, War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 525-6 (2004). Protocol I provides that mercenaries "shall not
have the right to be a combatant or prisoner of war," and defines a mercenary as "one who (a) is
specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a
direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of
its armed forces." Protocol I, supra note 53, art. 47(1).
55. 1 adapt Benedict Anderson's observation. Anderson, in insisting on the national nature of
Tombs to the Unknown Soldiers, writes: "The cultural significance of such monuments becomes even
clearer if one tries to imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals.
Is a sense of absurdity unavoidable." BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 10 (1990).
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which I return later). 6 Contractors are not included in overall troop
figures announced by U.S. officials, even though at present in Iraq they
are more or less at parity.5 7 Contractor deaths are not included in the daily
body count of soldiers (by one estimate they have been killed at a rate one
quarter that of U.S. soldiers), nor are they given official medals, pensions,
or public honors.5 8 (In fact, individual contractors have been given medals
from the United States, including Bronze Stars and Purple Hearts, in
recognition of their service; but the military has said it intends to retract
59
the medals.)
Contractors are also excluded from less formal recognition: for instance,
at an event attended by 8,000 people in Leesburg, Florida to honor the
troops, Rep. Troutman, explained to the Washington Post why contractors
were not also honored at the event: "This was for the servicemen and
women who are not there by choice; to me, that makes a difference." The
contractor, the Representative explained, may "come back home"
whenever he wants.6 °
We might suppose that for the U.S. government, and the American
public more generally, the contractor's death is neither offered nor
received as a "sacrifice." This sense is strengthened when we reflect on
the intellectual pedigree that surrounds the turn to private military
contractors, i.e., the ideas associated with privatization, outsourcing, neoliberalism, etc.-lines of thought and argument which are, to say the least,
skeptical of public spiritedness as a firm ground upon which to build
government policy, and for which the very notion of sacrifice may be
analytically impossible, all action being either self-interested or morally

56. 38 U.S.C. § 2402 (2003) (listing persons eligible for interment in national cemeteries).
57. John M. Broder & James Risen, ContractorDeaths in Iraq Soar to Record, N. Y. TIMES, May
19, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/middleeast/l 9contractors.html
(noting that almost "300 companies from the United States and around the world supply workers who
are a shadow force in Iraq almost as large as the uniformed military .... about 126,000 men and
women working for contractors serve alongside about 150,000 American troops, the Pentagon has
reported"); see James Risen, U.S. Spending on Contractorsin Iraq Reportedto Reach $85 Billion,
INT. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 13, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/12/
america/contractor.php (claiming that there are more contractors than U.S. soldiers in Iraq).
58. Broder & Risen, supra note 57 (estimating that 917 contractors had been killed in Iraq). Only
a small portion of the total number of contractors are armed-but of that smaller group, the mortality
rate may be higher than soldiers. Moreover, since the deaths of non-U.S. citizen contractors are not,
under U.S. Department of Labor rules, required to be reported, there is likely under-reporting in that
category. THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE INIRAQ 371 (2007). For
discussion of the lack of medical care provided to contractors as compared with soldiers, see Matthew
Kestian, Civilian Contractors: Forgotten Veterans of the War on Terror, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 887
(2008).
59. Renae Merle, Contract Workers Are War's Forgotten:Iraq Deaths Create Subculture of Loss,
WASH. POST, July 31, 2004, at A L;see also Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly
Blurred Between Soldiers and Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004 at Al (writing that
the Pentagon mistakenly awarded honors to contractors).
60. Merle, supra note 59. Of course, if it is choice that distinguishes the two, it might be objected
that the soldier is increasingly a paid professional and a volunteer, not a draftee.
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abhorrent, since it entails a giving of the inalienable self.6
While it does not frame the issue as one of sacrifice, Peter Singer's book
Corporate Warriors provides support for the claim that the avoidance of
sacrificial meaning was central to the emergence of the contractor sector
in the post-Cold War era. Contractor firms got their first significant entrre
into the U.S. foreign policy under President Clinton.62 It was in the
Balkans, Singer writes, when Clinton, seeking to pursue an unpopular
intervention, but unwilling to call up 9,000 reservists-which he deemed
too politically costly-arrived at the solution that the military would "pass
the work on" to Texas-based Brown & Root Services.63 It is under
President Bush (and Vice President Dick Cheney, former head of
contracting giant Halliburton) that the move to contractors has accelerated
exponentially, but it is important to recognize that there has been biSome skeptics
partisan support for this "reinventing" of government.'
have urged that this reinvention has not actually downsized the
government, but has simply made it less accountable to the public. In the
words of a critic, it allows the government to "grow itself' invisibly since
''government contractors are not normally counted in tallies of the federal
workforce and because there is no easily accessed means for accounting
even for how many government contracts are in existence."6 5 This creative
accounting seems analogous to what we see in the military contractor case,
where it is sacrifice that is pushed off the books.
In summary, the turn to the military contractor represents, we might
argue, an attempt by officials to designate, by law, policy and cultural
tradition, a class of individuals whose deaths will be banal and
insignificant to a national audience. Their relation to the body politic
would be one of contract and subcontract, not sacrifice.

61. See, e.g., Milton Friedman's complaint about President Kennedy's famous line from his
inaugural address--"Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
country." Friedman objected: "The organismic, 'what you can do for your country' implies that
government is the master or deity, the citizen the servant or votary." MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH ROSE
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 1 (1962).
62. PETER SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 6
(2003). Singer notes that the deaths of three DynCorp contractors in Colombia did not produce any
"public outcry nor crash investigations, unlike what would have happened in an accident involving
U.S. military personnel" and the death of another contractor did not require the U.S. embassy to
release the same information as it would have had the contractor been a soldier. Id. at 208-9. Singer
links the prestige in the United States as stemming "from the perceived integrity and values of the
soldiers within it and the spirit of selfless service embodied in their duty on behalf of the country." Id.
at 204. "It is clear, however, that private military activity does indeed associate the military profession
with the profit motive, in opposition tothe very values that incur public esteem". Id. at 205.
63. Id. at 6.
64.

BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA: THE ERUPTION OF

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 176-77 (1995) (comparing President Clinton's privatization agenda with
that of Presidents Reagan and H.W Bush).
65. Chris Sagers, The Myth of Privatization,59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, n.1 15 (2007).
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B. Sacrificefor the Client
Among contractors, another position can be detected. The epigraph to
this Article is from a website for private military contractors: it speaks of
contractors whose deaths were an "ultimate sacrifice" and "is dedicated to
the men who gave their lives so 'the client' would be safe." 66 In the
military context, we typically think of sacrifice as something the soldier
does for the nation or state, at least if we recall Lincoln at Gettysburg
when he speaks of the "consecration" of the battlefield by those who
"gave their lives that [the] nation might live."67 Yet the quote from the
contractor website suggests that for the contractors themselves, as well as
for their employers and their families, their deaths may indeed be seen as
"sacrifices." A journalist recounts that Blackwater has created a
"memorial rock garden on their compound in Moyock, where each
contractor that [sic] has been killed while serving the company is given a
stone with their name engraved on it." 68 The memorial includes a life-size
sculpture of a young boy, head turned down, clutching to his breast a
ceremonially folded U.S. flag. A dedication provides: "This memorial is
dedicated to the courage and honor of our fallen teammates. Their
dedication and sacrifice will never be forgotten. May God bless them and
their families." 69 One way we might conceive of this entire elaboration of
ritual and sacralized recognition is as a migration of the sacred into the
private and corporate world, one that runs parallel to an effort by officials
to unbundle the sacred and the state through privatization.
The use of contractors can thus be called an outsourcing of sacrifice-it
maintains that sacrifice takes place, but the significance is removed from
the purview of the government and the public and is contained within the
private sphere of the family and the company. This view rejects the
assumption that sacrifice can only exist for the nation, that the state
monopolizes not only legitimate violence, as Max Weber urged, but
sacrifice as well.7°
C. Outsourcing Sacrifice
A third view which can be detected in the United States' reception and
classification of deaths of U.S. citizen contractors (although there are a
few examples of it extending to non-citizens), is that not only are the
contractors' deaths sacrifices for the employer, they are also sacrifices to
66. The Red Zone, supra note 1.
67. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, supra note 45.
68. Bill Sizemore, Suit Against Blackwaterover ContractorGoes to Arbitration,VIRGINIA-PILOT,
May 20, 2007, available at http://hamptonroads.com/node/26905 1.
69. See Blackwater, www.blackwaterusa.com/press/memorial.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2008).
70. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS INSOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., Oxford University Press 1958) ("[A] state is a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.").
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and for the United States-the client. In this remarkable view, which
President Bush expressed after the killing of civilians in Baghdad in
2007, 7' sacrifice is still "outsourced" in the sense that it is not performed
by individuals bearing the marks of the sovereign-the uniform or the
flag-but it is not outsourced in the sense that the deaths are seen,
recognized and honored by the United States, albeit in an ad hoc and
belated manner.
The state, nation, or public returns as the recipient of the sacrifice,
rejecting the dichotomy between monetary self-interest and national
service. Only a few years ago it would probably have been difficult to
detect this alignment of contract and sacrifice: the mercenary would have
been the most likely template for the armed contractor. Above all, such an
alignment-had it existed in the mind of the general public-would have
undermined an important attraction for policy makers of contractors in the
first place, that is, that contractors deaths were not construed as
"sacrifices." The American legal and public imagination is still in the
process of locating and giving meaning to the suffering of contractorsbut it is possible to detect an emergent conception of the civilian-soldier,
as contrasted with the citizen-soldier. Whether officials can designate a
group of individuals whose deaths on behalf of the state will be ineligible
for national sacrifice is still undetermined.
Examples of efforts to honor and give medals to contractors both
illustrate this outsourcing of sacrifice and perhaps suggest an even more
nuanced structure. The U.S. government has deemed that contractors are
eligible for public honor by the United States, but only as civilians,
through awards such as the Defense of Freedom Medal. These are
described on an official website as the "civilian equivalent" of a Purple
Heart, 72 as both require the recipient to have been injured or killed. 7' The

Defense of Freedom medals were initially given to civilian Pentagon
employees in 2001, but slowly, many years later, they are being given to
contractors. The stories from these events are ambiguous so far as
sounding like examples of honored sacrifice. For example, contracting
giant Kellog, Brown & Root asked contractors who were eligible to
receive the award to sign a release waiving any future medical claims
against KBR before they could receive the award. This is somewhat
71. See Associated Press, Blackwater Will Probably Leave Iraq, Officials Say, Oct. 17, 2007,
available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21352794 (President Bush, commenting on investigations into

Blackwater for shooting civilians in September 2007, was quoted as saying: "1 will be anxious to see
the analysis of their performance." The quote continued: "There's a lot of studying going on, both
inside Iraq and out, as to whether or not people violated rules of engagement. I will tell you, though,

that a firm like Blackwater provides a valuable service. They protect people's lives, and I appreciate
the sacrifice and the service that the Blackwater employees have made").
72. Exec. Order No. 11,016, 3 C.F.R. 596 (1959-1963).
73. See Official Site of the Defense of Freedom, www.defenseoffreedom.com (last visited Dec.
26, 2008); see also Jim Garamone, Intelligence Agency Presents Defense of Freedom Medals, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, OCT. 19, 2001 ("The medal commemorates their valor and sacrifice").
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scandalous since there is no provision for such waivers in the eligibility
guidelines for the medal, which has simple criteria-injury or death. Even
so, it is interesting as an explicitly exchange-oriented conception of
recognition-the medal is given in "consideration" 74 for the waiver of
claims. Describing an event where these medals were awarded, the L.A.
Times recounted a remarkable scene in 2007:
Executives in dark blue suits shifted uncomfortably as an Army
major general in battle fatigues awarded posthumous Defense of
Freedom medals to the families' loved ones, all contractors killed
while working in Iraq. But this was no public recognition of sacrifice.
The event was held in secret, with guards to keep out the media. The
Army even refused to release the names of those it was honoring.
The nation's gratitude was delivered behind closed doors.75
In terms of my three renditions of the relation between the contractor
and sacrifice, this tableau suggests another permutation. The deaths are
sacrifices, they are recognized as for the nation, but-and this is the
"innovation" on my version-the "nation" does not include the public at
large. A similar story can be seen with respect to private contractor
companies. In addition to government awards, contractor companies have
developed their own medals. Thus we can juxtapose the two vectors of
recognition that greet the dead contractor: one is from the state, another
from the private sector, but both seem to share an awkwardness in being
neither public nor private events. In 2008, Blackwater's efforts extended
to an awards ceremony where Blackwater founder, Eric Prince, gave out
the Blackwater Worldwide Defense of Liberty Medal to injured
contractors. On the one hand the "sacrifices" recognized were in the
service of the United States (not to mention "Liberty"), since the medals
were for those contractors and employees who have been killed or
wounded in the "service of their country." But, on the other hand, the
event was, the Blackwater website stated "a quiet one as this was not a
public recognition of sacrifice" and the "names of the honored were not
released to the media., 76 In both of these stories of honoring, by the
government and Blackwater, there is talk of sacrifice but there is also
secrecy, suggesting a structure reminiscent of the ways that many soldiers'
deaths have also been secluded into a "family" and "private" sphere.

74. See Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., Authorization and Release Form 5, available at
www.democrats.senate.gov/dpcfhearings/hearing37/allenallexhibits.pdf ("Paragraph 9. Release: I
agree that in consideration for the application for a Defense of Freedom Medal on my behalf that on

behalf of myself, my heirs, executors, administrators, assigns and successors, I hereby release, acquit
and discharge and do hereby release, acquit and discharge KBR, all KBR employees, the Military and
any of their representatives...").
75.

T. Christian Miller, The Battle Scars of a Private War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, at Al.

76. Dana Richardson, Blackwater Worldwide Defense of Liberty Medal: Wounded Independent
Contractors Are Recognized, www.blackwaterusa.comfbtw2008/article/ medals.pdf.
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III.THE SACRIFICE AT FALLUJAH

While stopped in traffic, several armed Iraqi insurgents walked up
behind these two unarmored vehicles and repeatedly shot these four
Americans at point blank range, dragged them from their vehicles,
beat, burned and disfigured them and desecrated their remains.
-Plaintiffs

Complaint, Nordan v. Blackwater77

This Part examines one example of the difficulties entailed in creating a
group of unsacrificeable subjects. This came early in the U.S. war in Iraq,
in March 2004, when four armed Blackwater contractors were ambushed,
and then grotesquely and spectacularly killed, dismembered, and
immolated, by hundreds of Iraqis and insurgents in Fallujah. For many
U.S. officials and media commentators, these acts of "desecration," as
many called them, re-nationalized what had been privatized, and the
deaths were conceived by many as sacrifices on behalf of the United
States.
A. From Contractto Sacrifice
In March 2004, four armed military contractors employed by
Blackwater Security Consulting were escorting kitchen supply trucks
through Fallujah-although they were U.S. citizens, numerous layers of
contracting and subcontracting separated them from the U.S. government.
Each contractor had entered into an Independent Contractor Service
Agreement with Blackwater. They were to provide security and logistical
aid to ESS Support Services Worldwide, which, in turn, had contracted
with Kellog, Brown & Root, which, in turn, contracted with the U.S.
Army. Blackwater and its partner in the venture, Regency Hotel and
Hospital Company, had signed a contract with ESS.7 8 A sub-contract was
entered into on March 12, 2004 between Regency and Blackwater that
gave Blackwater control over the security detail. This sub-contract, the
families of the killed contractors have alleged, omitted certain protections
provided for in the primary contract, such as armored vehicles, while the
individual contractors were advised only of provisions of the primary
contract.
On March 30, the four contractors were sent on a mission to escort three
ESS kitchen supply trucks to a military base. Without maps, with no
77. Plaintiffs Complaint at 117, Nordan v. Blackwater, No. 05-CVS-000173 (North Carolina,
Wake County Superior Court, Jan. 5, 2005) [hereinafter "Complaint"]. Blackwater also uses the word
"desecrated." Response to "Majority Staff Report on Private Military Contractors in Iraq: An
Examination of Blackwater's Actions in Fallujah" 3 (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter: Response] (on file with
author) ("Following the attack, the four American bodies were dragged from their vehicles,
desecrated/set on fire, and hung from a bridge").
78. In the Complaint, supra note 77, 7-10, the contractual structure is described.

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[21:1

familiarity of the area, and no logistical support, the convoy got lost. The
families of the contractors (who, as discussed below, have brought a
lawsuit against Blackwater) also allege that they were not given the
correct weapons, and were not allowed to practice with the weapons they
did receive. On their first night out, they were lucky to find haven in a
Marine base. They set out the next day, and plotted a course through
Fallujah, even though it was considered hostile by the military. With only
four personnel in unarmored vehicles, and trapped in a dense urban
setting, it was easy work for their attackers to kill them.
Amidst great public excitement and drawing a crowd numbering in the
hundreds, the contractors were dragged through the streets behind a
vehicle, torn limb from limb, and immolated. Finally, portions of two of
the contractors' bodies were hung on a bridge over the Euphrates river.
The attack was accompanied by denunciations of the United States and the
burning of the American flag. The event was videotaped and edited to
include an introduction and narrative from a participant-including,
according to an American journalist, praise to Allah and a statement that
"We did not kill them, they kill themselves"--which was then posted on
the Internet and disseminated to media outlets.79 Images of the event
dominated the print and television news in the United States, 80 conjuring
an atmospherics, for the American television audience, entirely different
from the earlier "Shock and Awe" phase of the war.
Immediately after the attacks, the deaths were compared by officials and
mainstream media commentators in the United States to those of the U.S.
Army Rangers killed and desecrated in Somalia during the Clinton
Presidency. The Somalia deaths had attained iconic status, symbolizing
American retreat when faced with the death of its own soldiers. The fear
of a repeat performance, the "Mogadishu effect," was no doubt important
to officials who had subsequently made timely extraction of injured
soldiers pivotal to their protocols-recognizing that the body of the soldier
was an invaluable canvas upon which to work.8" And the shock of this
event itself reinforced reliance on contractors by President Clinton in
Bosnia and Colombia. What is remarkable, at least given our assumption
that the contractor is ineligible for sacrifice, is the ease with which the
79.

ROBERT YOUNG PELTON, LICENSED TO KILL: HIRED GUNS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 134

(2006).
80. Images of the attack ran on the front page of The New York Tinmes, USA Today, and the
Washington Post. The propriety of the publication of the gruesome images was itself a topic of debate.
81. Gwynne Dyer, The Fallujah Effect, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 2004, ("In the mid'90s there used to be something called the 'Mogadishu line' which the U.S. military were never
supposed to cross. Rounding up from the 18 U.S. soldiers who were killed in one day in Mogadishu in
1993, it was a doctrine which stated that the U.S. armed forces should undertake no overseas mission
that was likely to cause the deaths of more than 20 American soldiers except when vital national
interests were involved. That was far too simplistic, of course-it was not so much the number of dead
Americans as the videotape of their bodies being dragged before cheering crowds that turned the U.S.
public against Somalia-but that is why this incident may mark a turning point").
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contractors were assimilated to a consecrated status.82 The private relation
of contract did not restrict the relays between individual and the U.S.
audience; no matter that in the usual course of events, as noted,
contractors' deaths are not counted, announced, or publicly mourned.
Among commentators, there were rare exceptions to this sympathetic
identification with the contractors, which only underscored the depth of
the acceptance of the contractors as being, above all, "Americans." For
instance, a blogger wrote on his prominent site the Daily Kos: "They
aren't in Iraq because of orders, or because they are there trying to help
the people make Iraq a better place. They are there to wage war for profit.
Screw them. '83 This reaction itself became a minor scandal; the blog was
subjected to criticism from across the political spectrum, and the author
was ultimately obliged to account for and contextualize his harsh language
(he explained that his exposure to civil war as a child in Central America
made him hostile to anyone who would go to a war zone to make a
profit).84
The response to the attack was not left to the other contracting party,
Blackwater, or to the numerous intermediate parties, or even to military
officials on the ground. Four days later, at the direction of the White
House and the Secretary of Defense, military officials on the ground were
ordered to invade the city, over the objections of on-site commanders.85
Even though military officials were extremely critical of the fact that the
contractors represented the United States to Iraqis with very little military
oversight or control, and despite envy and animosity between ordinary
soldiers and contractors, the Marines named the bridge where the bodies
were hung "Blackwater Bridge." The U.S. military siege of the city led to
approximately 800 Iraqi civilian deaths.8 6 The insurgents managed to hold
the city, which itself marked an important point in the rise of the
insurgency. 87 U.S. forces launched a second assault in November 2004 in
82. William Kristol, After Fallujah, WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/ContentlPublic/Articles/000/000/003/945uchaa.asp ("The similarity
struck everyone right away: Mogadishu, October 3, 1993; Fallujah, March 31, 2004. But we cannot
permit these two outrages to be similar in their effect" since, according to Kristol, Mogadishu had lead
to the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and to genocide in Rwanda. To "properly honor[] the sacrifice
of those who died on March 31 in Fallujah" the U.S. should "deepen" its "commitment to victory" and
act aggressively against hostile residents). Mark Bowden, author of BLACK HAWK DOWN, a book
about the Mogadishu incident, also compared Fallujah to Mogadishu. Mark Bowden, The Lessons of
Mogadishu, WALL STREET J., Apr. 5 2004.
83.

Corpses on the Cover, DAILY Kos, Apr.

1, 2004, www.dailykos.com/story/2004/4/l/

144156/3224.
84. Presidential candidate John Kerry dropped the link on his official web page to the blogger: "In
light of the unacceptable statement about the death of Americans made by Daily Kos, we have
removed the link to this blog from our website." Quoted in Drudge Report, Apr. 4, 2004,
www.drudge.com/2004/20040404.php.
85. RICKS, supra note 58.
86. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY
ARMY 143 (2007).
87. RICKS, supra note 58, at 435.
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which the city suffered massive damage. While the events at Fallujah
brought the contractors into public view for the U.S. public as sacralized
persons, the deaths of Iraqi civilians in the fighting in the city were mostly
unreported-and those who did report on those deaths were, according to
88
some accounts, specifically targeted by the United States in the siege.
Put another way, while the sacred contractor was perhaps an unexpected
occurrence, the U.S. audience would be carefully protected from exposure
to the suffering of Iraqi civilians.
From what we know of the perspective of the attackers as reported in
the U.S. media, the event is full of sacrificial thematics and evinces a
complex global exchange. According to one account, some participants
declared that "With our blood and our souls, we will sacrifice for Islam"
and one resident compared the contractors bodies, dangling from the
bridge, to "slaughtered sheep"-an archetypal sacrificial victim. 89 Nir
Rosen described the attacks as part of a standardized routine, akin to an
American lynching: "There is a word for this sort of thing. In Iraqi
dialect, the Arabic word sahl, which literally means dragging a body down
the street, has grown to mean any sort of public massacre."90 In another
report, the Brigades of Martyr Ahmed Yassin claimed authorship of the
attack, describing it as "a gift from the people of Fallujah to the people of
Palestine and the family of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who was assassinated
by the criminal Zionists."'" (The square where the attack took place was
renamed for the slain Sheikh). Blackwater's account of the attack
emphasized that the contractors were targeted as Americans: "The ESS
truck drivers-all third country nationals-were intentionally spared and
left to escape... The ambush, apparently, was only intended to kill the
Americans."9 2 Indeed, the attackers do not seem to have been aware of or
interested in the fact that the Americans were contractors and not soldiers,
though they were not wearing uniforms. In some accounts, the attackers
93
thought the contractors were spies.
The sacrificial status of the victims (as contrasted with the perpetrators)
of terrorist and insurgent violence has received little attention, although

88. SCAHILL,supra note 86, at 138-41.
89. Id.at 103.
90. Nir Rosen,
Home
Rule,
NEW
YORKER,
July
5,
2004,
available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2OO4/07/05/040705fafact.
91. John Lee Anderson offered this description of the various groups active in Fallujah at the time
of the attack: "The men in Fallujah who were fighting the Americans were an amalgam of disgruntled
tribesmen, Baathists, old Republican Guards, criminals.. and a number of Islamist foreign fighters.
The day after the murder and mutilation of the American contractors, a group calling itself the
Brigades of Martyr Ahmed Yassin claimed that the killings had been carried out in retaliation for
Israel's assassination of Yassin, the Hamas leader..." John Lee Anderson, Letter from Baghdad,NEW
YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 63.
92. Blackwater emphasized that the cause of the incident was betrayal by Iraqi forces, not its own
incompetence. See Response, supra note 77, at 3.
93. SCAHILL, supra note 86, at 101.
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Arjun Appadurai has described the genre of the videotaped beheading of
kidnapping victims, starting with that of journalist Daniel Pearl, as a
"public sacrifice." " Whether or not the Iraqi insurgents were making a
conscious reference to sacrifice in their mode of killing the contractors, the
stark resemblance to standard forms of scapegoating is hard to dismiss.
While the United States may have carefully blocked, through the various
layers of contract, many of the pathways along which sacrificial
identification could travel, the attackers positioned their action as one
addressed to the United States through the bodies of the contractors.
However we construe the Iraqis' intentions and the audience they meant
to address, for much of the American audience, the attackers released the
latent sacrificial potential of the contractors as American citizens. To
make an analogy to the law of business organizations, the attack pierced
the veil of contractual intermediaries, making visible for Americans the
displaced tie between themselves and the contractors. As important as the
communications infrastructure of a hand-held video recorder and
distribution was-and it was clearly essential-we should not let a focus
on the technology overshadow the content of what was communicated,
and what message was received. If we ask the question of what went
wrong with the U.S.' effort to displace sacrificial meaning, the attackers'
specific framing of their assault as one on the United States is important.
We can also have recourse to American popular sovereignty, which, as
Kahn puts it, "tells us that we--each of us-are the popular sovereign, that
our bodies constitute its body."9 5
It was precisely this location of sovereignty in the body of the individual
citizen that is credited for the restriction of mercenary activity by the
United States through neutrality laws shortly after the American
Revolution. This distribution of sovereignty made it increasingly difficult
for states to deny responsibility for or identification with the violence
employed by their citizens abroad-be that mercenary, filibuster, privateer
or pirate violence. Janice Thomson writes that doing so was "inconsistent
94. ARJUN APPADURAI, FEAR OF SMALL NUMBERS 12 (2006) ("Let me conclude this overview by
focusing on the most recent form of public and mass-mediated shock to enter the dramas of violence
staged in the name of religion, nationality, freedom and identity, namely the videotaped kidnappings
of victims in Iraq and, in some instances, their beheading, as a media tool for exerting asymmetric
pressure on various states, most recently India, by groups associated with militant Islam. In some
ways, we see a return here to the simplest forms of religious violence, the sacrifice, about which Rene
Girard has written eloquently. Starting with the videotaped beheading of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan
soon after 9/11, the public sacrifice has grown into a more systematic tool of political expression")
(internal citation omitted); see also FAISAL DEVJI: LANDSCAPES OF THE JIHAD: MILITANCY,
MORALITY, MODERNITY 96 (2005) ("Indeed, there is a sense in which even the jihad's enemies--or
victims-come to participate in the rites of martyrdom by dying alongside its suicide bombers in
spectacular set-pieces like the attacks of 9/11. This may explain why supporters of the jihad are
forever drawing parallels between its own dead and those of its enemies, because both coalesce in a
community of martyrdom made possible by the virtual intimacy of the media, which allows each party
to exchange words and deeds with the other").
95.

KAHN, supra note 2, at 246.
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with the view that sovereignty came not from God through the monarch
but from man or the citizen himself. With the individual citizen as the
ostensible source of sovereignty, the state could no longer disclaim
responsibility for his violent activities in the international system."96 In
destroying the contractors' bodies, the Fallujah attackers simultaneously
gave them back to the United States as citizens. To more successfully
outsource sacrifice, policy makers should not employ U.S. citizens, and
yet doing so would bolster claims that the contractors are mercenaries.
B. Desecrationand the Empty Place
Is it the case that the American public saw "the sovereign" in the
charred remains of their countrymen? Borrowing from Claude Lefort and
Bruce Ackerman, I wish to suggest one way we might approach this
question.
In an important essay, "The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?"
Lefort describes that at the center of contemporary democratic politics we
do not have a King, but what Lefort calls an "empty place."9 7 The popular
sovereign
has the status of a subject. The people possesses sovereignty; they
are assumed to express its will; power is evoked is exercised in their
name; politicians constantly evoke them. But the identity of the
people remains latent. Quite apart from the fact that the notion of the
people is dependent upon a discourse which names the people, which
is itself multiple and which lends the people multiple dimensions, and
that the status of a Subject can only be defined in terms of a juridical
96.

JANICE E.

THOMSON, MERCENARIES,

PIRATES AND SOVEREIGNS;

STATE-BUILDING AND

EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 148 (1994). Thomson describes the
controversy over mercenaries who sold their labor on the international market as posing the question
of whether the mercenary was "a market actor, pursuing private ends through the sale of his labor? Or
was he a political actor for whose actions his home state could be held accountable?" Id. at 55. In
addition to the popular sovereignty explanation for the phase-out of the mercenary, Thomson also says
that the ban of non-state violence "is principally the result of interstate relations" not "from within the
'society.' Id. at 147. She writes that "the problem did not come from the demand side; states like
Great Britain were more than happy to hire foreigners to fight their wars. Instead, the problem
emerged on the supply side; a state that allowed its citizens or subjects to serve in a belligerent's
military could not claim neutrality. In short, states began to hold [in the late 1700s] one another
accountable for the international actions of individuals under their sovereign jurisdictions. The threat
was real, belligerents could reject the state's claim to neutrality and draw it into war." Id. at 59. That
is, states compel one another to monopolize force. The U.S. position as a superpower seems deeply
relevant to this line of argument: following the same logic, we might seek to interpret the emergence
of contractors as derivative of the U.S.' position as a superpower, i.e., a context where the "interstate
relations" that force a state to take responsibility for its citizens are attenuated. For another recounting
of the "de-privatization" process in relation to U.S. naval power in the 1890s, see Nicholas Parillo, The
De-privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately
Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1,5 ("Overall, it seems,
the nation's new imperial ambitions and consequent strategic imperatives not only banished
privateering from the realm of possibility, but also transformed the Navy itself into a 'not-for-profit'
organization").
97. Claude LeFort, The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?, in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 213-55 (David Macey, trans., Basil Blackwell 1988)
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constitution, the people are, as we have noted, dissolved into a
numerical element at the very moment of the manifestation of their
will.9"

This notion of the empty place and the inability of "the People" to fill it
are helpful in opening up a perspective from which to think about what is
happening in American political culture when we seize on images of
ourselves in a burst of recognition-in the attack at Fallujah, in New York
on 9/11. But I am anticipating-first, I wish to juxtapose Bruce
Ackerman's conception of our constitutional order.
Ackerman is well known for his "dualist" conception of the U.S.
Constitutional order. 99 During the Founding itself, the Reconstruction Era,
and the New Deal, political elites have pushed beyond established
institutional forms to create new ways to fuse mobilized popular
sovereignty to reasoned deliberation. These are acts of higher lawmaking,
constitutional moments, of which it may be said that "the People" have
reappeared on the political stage and given considered approval to
significant change. Ordinarily, however, American democracy follows the
path of what Ackerman calls normal politics, during which decisions are
made by political representatives-not the People. At such times of
00
demobilization, Ackerman speaks of "the absent People."'
At one point in We the People, Ackerman describes normal politics as
entailing a semiotic, not a mimetic, form of representation.1 1 A mimetic
form of representation entails an institutional order that gives the public
the appearance of being a reflection, a mirror, of itself. Like a photograph
or a naturalistic portrait, it does not call attention to the form of
representation itself, but rather seems to be neutral and transparent. The
semiotic form, by contrast, calls attention to the form of representation, as
does a Cubist painting which accentuates some features of the object
represented over others. The bulging eyes and distended forms in
Picasso's Guernica captures something other than a photograph of the
bombed city. The U.S. Constitution provides, Ackerman urges, a semiotic
form of representation during normal politics. Each branch of government
traces a different path and timeframe of representation (from direct
election by citizens to appointment by the President; two, four, six year
electoral cycles, and life-time appointments; the horizontal separation of
powers at the federal level and a vertical separation with the states) each
of which, in a controversy, presents the public with differently compelling
claims to be acting in the name of the People. This form of representation
rejects the relation of synecdoche-in which a part (the government)
98.

Id. at 230 (emphasis added).

99. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993).
100. Id. at 264.
101. Id.at179-99.
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stands in for the whole (the People). As with the Cubist painting, the
public sees an image that calls attention to the complexity of
representation. In sum, normal politics entails a semiotic form of
representation: it excludes the possibility that a "small group can ever be
transubstantiated into the People."' 2
Yet this is only part of the story of American political practice for
Ackerman. He detects a recurrent practice during which a different
register of political meaning is engaged: one in which, through broad,
deep, and sustained dialogue and debate, Americans have substantially
revised core parts of their constitutional order. While during normal
politics "the People simply do not exist," during higher lawmaking, the
entity and process that is "the People" become visible.'0 3 Ackerman
hesitates in asserting that representation itself is overcome by
instantiation: he does not, for instance, describe the emerging People in
terms of "transubstantiation" of the citizenry. Yet Ackerman would likely
reject Lefort's notion that there is invariably an "empty place" at the
center of democratic politics.
What does this have to do with Fallujah? My suggestion is that what
America is offered in the various tableaus that terrorize-9/l 1, Daniel
Pearl, Fallujah-might be thought of as interacting with the issue of the
"empty place" and the forms of representation which Ackerman details.
Ackerman offers us one way to get from representation to instantiationbut it is certainly not the only way. These forms of violence provide
another (certainly not with the same democratic pedigree as Ackerman's
constitutional moments, but that is not at issue). Through violence the
attackers instantiate in individual bodies and objects the idea of the
country, the nation, the state-even We the People-for a national
audience. If we conceive of Ackerman's dualism as operating through
semiotic representation in the realm of normal politics, and dialogic
instantiation in higher lawmaking, the attack at Fallujah engages another
dimension of political action: sacrifice and desecration. Here it is
spectacular violence against objects and persons targeted because they are
American that plays the central role in overcoming the gap that
representation entails between individuals, the People, and institutional
form (the government), into the unity of instantiation. Spectacular
sacrificial violence marks, for a given audience, bodies and objects as
embodiments of the United States. Momentarily, part does stand in for
whole.
The notion of sacrifice does not grasp the provocative quality of the
action in Fallujah-though the etymology of the word sacrifice, to "make
sacred," seems on point so far as the reception by the United States is
102.
103.

Id. at 184-85 (emphasis removed from first quotation).
Id. at 263.
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concerned. This emerges not only from the attack's grotesque character,
but also from the most obvious point: the attack was aimed at someone
else's sacred character; it was a "desecration." Yet desecration entails
destroying something already sacred-as in the cases of "Koran
desecration," or in proposed constitutional amendments banning the
"desecration" of the U.S. flag." 4 Given that one of the attractions of the
military contract worker is that they are not located as sacred charactersunlike the soldier in the armed forces whose death is officially a national
loss-we see that the reception of the Fallujah event entailed a resacralization (seeing the contractors as citizens, as belonging to the
sovereign), which was then followed by desecration.
Moreover, while sacrifice is often described as action contained within
ritual and legal formats, and is thus formalized and institutionalized, in
this incident it emerges as an assertion, a claim that cuts across the legal
order advanced by the United States. The designation of "sacrifice" is
essentially retrospective. Compared with sacrifice, which is contained by
the state and exemplified by war memorials, this is unexpected and
entrepreneurial.
Even if there is merit in deploying Ackerman and Lefort to grasp what
is going on in this setting, the appearance of the United States or other
abstract notion does not in and of itself lead to any particular outcome. It
seems, rather, to be a resource that can be deployed to a variety of ends.
For example, while the Fallujah killing brought added scrutiny, ultimately
it seems to have served to legitimate the contractor industry. Like
soldiers, contractors could have national meanings inscribed on their
bodies. Jeremy Scahill, author of a book-length expos6 of Blackwater,
describes the effect of the Fallujah attack as "blowing open a door to
Is it possible to explain the connection between
legitimacy. '"105
spectacular death and legitimization in this context? My analysis specifies
the thematic of sacrifice and the link to popular sovereignty. The Fallujah
case shows that the dichotomy between the contractor and sacrifice can be
transcended: relations can be at once contractual and sacrificial.

104. For an argument on the central role of negation in creating the sacred in a "disenchanted"
society, see MICHAEL TAUSSiG, DEFACEMENT: PUBLIC SECRECY AND THE LABOR OF THE NEGATIVE
13 (1999) ("The disenchantment of the world still seems to me a largely accomplished fact. What
exists now is perhaps best thought of as a new amalgam of enchantment and disenchantment, the
sacred existing in muted but powerful forms, especially-and this is my central preoccupation-in its
negative form as desecration." I would suggest that there remain in U.S. political culture official sites
of the sacred-the Constitution and other manifestations of the popular sovereign- even in the
absence of "desecration.").
105. SCAHILL,supra note 86, at 157.
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IV. THE OTHER SOVEREIGN
Despite the assimilation of the contractors to the high status enjoyed by
the soldiers killed in Somalia, the spectacular event did not, of course,
legally transform contractors into soldiers, nor did it entail the various
benefits and limitations that that transformation would bring. The families
of the Fallujah contractors, acting through the Estates of the deceased
brought a fraud and wrongful death suit against Blackwater-not the
United States, not the perpetrators-in North Carolina state court, alleging
that Blackwater had shown reckless disregard for the health and safety of
the contractors by sending them into hostile territory without adequate
06
preparation.
In the previous Part, I suggested that a deep structure of popular
sovereignty provided a pathway linking the killed contractors to a broader
U.S. audience. That is, I traced one way in which the event was received
by the U.S. audience-as evidenced by media reports and the reactions of
high-level officials. In this Part, I trace other ways in which the event at
Fallujah was received in the U.S. as it pulsed through the court system,
arbitration, and the political theatre of congressional hearings. In each of
these fora, the shape of the event changed and presented a variety of
alignments of public and private. It is hard to state with certainty that any
one of these should be read as indicative of the shape of enduring
imaginative horizons, but they are suggestive of the range of possible
ways in which Americans think about contractors. I begin by describing
Blackwater's response to the litigation brought by the parents of the killed
contractors and emphasize Blackwater's attempt to declare itself part of
the sovereign and hence immune from suit. This litigation part of the
story ends abruptly with the removal of the Estates' suit from state court to
secret arbitration proceedings.
I then describe how Blackwater was brought before Congress, where it
asserted a range of radically contrasting arguments: it insisted it was a
private entity that should not have to answer questions about its
profitability. It even pointed to the ongoing litigation as a reason why
Congress should hold off from investigating and thus respect the sanctity
of legal process. Thus if Blackwater was part of the sovereign before the
courts, it was part of the private sector before Congress. Aside from
seeing this as completely cynical, this shape-shifting is intriguing as a
form of power in its own right. Not all of Blackwater's arguments can be
shoe-homed into the public/private divide. Blackwater also insisted that it
was a patriotic company where veterans "re-enlist in the private sphere"
and that its members had sacrificed their lives to protect U.S. officials like
the very Congresspersons interrogating them. Here we return our
106.

Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC 382 F.Supp.2d 801 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
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discussion of outsourcing sacrifice and the deep power that comes from
dying for another-for although it is Congress that better represents the
U.S. public, Blackwater was able to say that its members had died for the
United States and thus could claim a particular form of authority. This last
scenario-in which political representatives confront the contractor who
employees-is particularly unsettling in
claims to have sacrificed
showing how the charismatic power of sacrifice and the sacred can be
deployed against long-established institutions.
Finally, this Part describes how contractors also advertise themselves as
part of a universal mission, one in which they not only sacrifice for the
United States, they give themselves for humanity. While this certainly
could pose a conflict with a notion that they are U.S. patriots, it need not.
After all, the United States is also, in important respects, a universal
project.
A. Seeking Immunity, FindingArbitration
Following the killings at Fallujah, the Estates of the killed contractors
brought a fraud and wrongful death suit against Blackwater in North
Carolina state court.1" 7 Blackwater vigorously sought to avoid facing a
group of local jurors who might award a large punitive damages award. In
establishing the nexus between the deaths and Blackwater's conduct, the
contractors' Estates urged that Blackwater was more concerned with
profits than the lives of their employees, or contractual obligations, and
that Blackwater "fraudulently and deceptively lur[ed] [the contractors]
away from their families and loved ones."'' They sought damages for
"mental anguish, fear and terror of being forced to travel into the center of
Fallujah.. .and the physical pain and suffering of being shot, beaten,
burned, tortured and dismembered."'0 9 Perhaps underlining that she was
not herself being mercenary, the mother of one of the contractors
explained to a journalist that she did not "intend to receive a penny of that
blood money" she might receive as damages, but rather that she was
"doing this so they do not mistreat others like they did my son and the
other men."110
The contractors' access to a jury of fellow civilians is a significant
benefit of not being a soldier, albeit a highly unpredictable one. A
windfall punitive damages award is a thing of popular fantasy and legal
possibility. The soldier, compensated with honor, medals and the
107. Nordan, 382 F.Supp.2d 801.
108. Plaintiff's Complaint, Nordan v. Blackwater, No. 05-CVS-000173 (North Carolina, Wake
County Superior Court, Jan. 5, 2005) 93.
109. Id.
110. Jay Price and Joseph Neff, Families Sue Over FallujahAmbush, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER,
Jan. 7, 2005, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/51 l/story/219750.html (last visited January
15, 2009).
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protections of the pension and other benefits of the regulatory state, is
generally excluded from state and federal courts. This exclusion is but a
part of the overall transformation of the soldier's status to something
closer, as the Army T-shirts say, to the "property" of the United States.
While the contractor can quit, the soldier who leaves can, under certain
circumstances, be executed for desertion.' 11 The difference is no doubt
appreciated by the many thousands of U.S. deserters who have taken
refuge in Canada. 12 The soldier's enlistment contract is akin to what Max
Weber described as a "status contract," which is what the courts call it as
well," 3 while a Marine who has fled to Canada calls it a "devils
contract."" 4 But what of the contractors' contract? Surely it is not such a
status contract that mystically merges the two parties and renders one
party unable to sue the other? After all, is not the essence of the entire
enterprise of privatization and subcontracting that the parties remain
distinct-that the contractors are not even employees but are "independent
contractors"?
Blackwater's various responses to the litigation are noteworthy and
underscore the innovate spaces contractor companies inhabit, moving in
and out of the sovereign sphere. Despite its founder Erik Prince's claim to
want to be the military services version of Federal Express, Blackwater
did not want to forgo certain benefits of being part of or associated with
the government. Blackwater argued that the Constitution's foreign affairs
and war powers clauses rendered Blackwater immune from suit in state
and federal court." 5 The United States, Blackwater urged, has a "unique
federal interest" "in the remedies available for those working in support of
national defense or war zone efforts,""' 6 and it claimed that it was the
"functional equivalent of a federal officer.""' 7
Blackwater thus attempted to shift the litigation from the everyday
world of contract and tort-where one might expect a private actor-into
another register, that of sovereignty and the sovereign's immunity from

111. 10 U.S.C. §§ 885(c) (Aug. 10, 1956) ("Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to
desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment
as a court-martial may direct...").
112.

Scott Pelley, Deserters: We Won't Go to Iraq, CBS News, Dec. 8, 2004, available at

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/l 2/06/6011/main659336.shtml.
113.

2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 668 (1978); See, e.g., In re Grimely, 137 U.S. 147,

151-52 (1890) (describing enlistment contracts as "special because they bring about a change in status,
from civilian to soldier, just like marriage contracts change a man's status to husband and the woman's
status to wife"); see also Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction by serviceman claiming that government's "stop-loss" policy was a breach of
contract).
114. Pelley, supra note 112 (quoting Pfc. Dan Felushko, "[N]obody should make me sign away
my ability to choose between right and wrong.").
115. See In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, 460 F.3d 576, 586 (4th Cir. 2006).
116. Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 811 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
117. In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, 460 F.3d at 590 n.8.
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If we can say that the contractors in Fallujah underwent the
suit."
transformation from an everyday status to a sacralized one, Blackwater
attempted to follow a parallel path, moving from the role of private
contractor to that of an actor that enjoys attributes of the sovereign, in
particular, its immunity from suit. We might gloss this as the intersection
of two traditions: one, derived from popular sovereignty that allows
Americans to see themselves in the bodies of fellow citizens, to see
"America" when they see the contractors' bodies desecrated; and another,
the tradition of governmental sovereignty, by which the state is itself a
sovereign and immune from suit.
For two years, Blackwater pushed these various claims, finally seeking
review from the U.S. Supreme Court with the assistance of Kenneth
Starr." 9 The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, declined to
remove the case from state court based on Blackwater's sovereign
immunity or other arguments. They did not reject them outright, but
found that they could be entertained in state court. 120 The Fourth Circuit
found Blackwater's simultaneous arguments that the federal courts should
remove the case from state court, and that federal courts did not have
jurisdiction "too extravagantly recursive for us to accept."' 21 Despite
Blackwater's lack of success, it would be premature to dismiss out of hand
the idea that it should enjoy immunity for the work it does, just as it is
premature to insist that the deaths of its workers are not sacrifices. For a
few months, discovery in the state court proceeded and the existential
threat of a large punitive damages award must have seemed a possibility to
Blackwater.
Blackwater, however, was finally able to derail the case with another
argument, one inspired not by its sovereign attributes but by a closer
reading of the adhesion contract it had required the contractors to sign.
The contract included a binding arbitration clause and Blackwater
successfully urged a federal court in April 2007 to send the matter to
arbitration (it is not apparent why Blackwater took two years to assert this

118. Another grounds for removal from state court that Blackwater urged was that of preemption
by the federal government worker's compensation scheme, the Defense Base Act, overseen by the
Department of Labor. Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 803. The Defense Base Act ("DBA"), 42 U.S.C. §§

1651-1654 (2000), provides for compensation for "the injury or death of any employee engaged in any
employment" "under a contract centered into with the United States or any executive department,
independent establishment, or any agency thereof .. " What is interesting about this, of course, is
that Blackwater seeks to avoid tort liability by urging that the "independent contractors" are now to be
construed as employees. For discussion of the Defense Base Act and the lack of medical care
available to military contractors, see Kestian, supra note 58, at 896 n.79 ("Wounded civilian
contractor employees deserve death and disability benefits commensurate with their status as wounded
veterans, but other military veteran's benefits should not be extended to them.").
119.

John M. Broder & James Risen, BlackwaterMounts a Defense With Top Talent, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 1, 2007, at Al.
120.

Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, 127 S. Ct. 1381 (2007).

121.

In re Blackwater Security Consulting, 460 F.3d at 592.
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argument). 122 Typically, arbitration takes place in private, the result is
confidential, and arbiters are generally not able to award punitive
damages. A Blackwater spokesperson commented to the press that
"Anyone who supports the rule of law should be encouraged to see the
written agreement finally being honored and the dispute heading to
arbitration as the parties agreed."' 2 3 The inclusion of binding arbitration
clauses in employment and independent contractor contracts is itself
related to broader currents of privatization and the valorization of nonpublic fora.'2 4
This waiver of the right to go before a court functions, in our narrative,
as a private version of claims for sovereign immunity. By different paths,
both remove the dispute from the courts. One emphasizes the absence of
the sovereign's consent, while the other points to the contractors' consent.
For our purposes, the end result, avoiding state court and a local jury, and
125
the public sphere more generally, is the same.
It is necessary to pause for a moment and acknowledge that there is
something surprising in the notion of sovereign immunity of the
government in a world of popular sovereignty. After all, the United States
is nowhere in the Constitution declared a sovereign, let alone one with
immunity. As Akhil Amar writes: "in America, neither federal institutions
not state governments were truly sovereign. Only the people were." 126
Likewise, thus far, I have asserted that the United States is grounded in
a concept of popular sovereignty, and that this is important in the ability of
the state/nation/sovereign to be seen and found in the body of the
contractor. And I have asserted that sovereignty and sacrifice are central
to the relation between the citizen and this popular sovereign: it is through
sacrifice, among other ways, that the citizen participates in the life of the
sovereign, dying so that it might live, as Lincoln would say. But there is
another idea of sovereignty at play also: it is not only the people who are
122. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, (E.D.N.C. 2:06-CV-49-F) (order dismissing
proceedings, Apr. 20, 2007, Judge Fox), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/321411/Nordan-vBlackwater-Security. (Independent Contractor Service Agreement provided in Section 20.1 that
"Contractor and BSC hereby agree that any dispute regarding interpretation or enforcement of any of
the parties' rights or obligations under this Agreement shall be solved by binding arbitration according
to the rules of the American Arbitration Association and shall be conducted in Currituck or Camden
County in North Carolina").
123. Sizemore, supra note 68 (quoting Anne Tyrell).
124. Clyde Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 685-86 (2004) ("The effect of the these
contracts has been to privatize justice, substituting privately constructed arbitration for publicly
established courts. This becomes particularly problematic when the rights being adjudicated are not
contractual rights created by the parties, but statutory rights created by Congress, or legal rights
established by common law.").
125. Much of the information in the public domain-and in this Article-about the Fallujah
incident came from the lawsuit brought by the contractors' families. Blackwater has sought to restrict
the families' ability to talk about the case by invoking the confidentiality agreements included in the
contracts.
126. AMAR,supra note 36, at 335-36.
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sovereign, but rather the government or state or union.
One evocation and explication of this other sovereignty (although not
directly related to immunity) can be found in Justice Sutherland's 193627
majority opinion in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corporation.'
He wrote that "[r]ulers come and go; governments end and forms of
government change; but sovereignty survives.... Sovereignty is never
held in suspense." He was speaking not of popular sovereignty or "We the
People," but of a different "power" that preceded the Constitution. This
was the power of "external sovereignty" which "passed from the Crown
not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and
corporate capacity as the United States of America." 128 Thus where our
standard story is one of a revolution in the location of sovereignty from
King to People, here we have an alternate version, one of continuity that
never touches the People but goes directly to the Union and the executive
in particular. 129 Both notions of the sovereign-the popular sovereign and
the governmental sovereign-point to a source outside and beyond the
constitutional order: one to the People, the other to the Crown or to
international law. I do not endeavor to theorize the relation between these
two, but to say, as Sutherland does, that these sovereignties can be
separated by a territorial trope such as inside/outside, domestic/foreign, is
not reassuring. 13 ° It was just such divides that total war-which was to
come soon after Sutherland's opinion-was to overwhelm, and which the
war on terror supposedly overwhelms as well. Just as the individual can
sacrifice to or for the popular sovereign, one can also do so for the
governmental sovereign.
The sovereign's immunity from litigation is one consequence of this
conception of the sovereign as anterior/exterior to the legal order-even if
we now prefer to ground immunity in a functional public policy analysis.
127. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). For discussion of the
"pendulum" swings between Curtiss-Wright and its lead competitor, Youngstown, see HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN CONTRA
AFFAIR 135 (1990).

128.

Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 316-17. For analysis of Sutherland's Opinion, see

Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of PlenaryPower Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,14 (2002) (describing the

opinion as culmination of nineteenth century state positivism which had flourished after the Civil War
in numerous areas of regulation, including immigration, relations with Indian nations and in the
territories, and urging that doctrine of inherent powers is difficult to defend or justify).

129.

Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (describing President as the "sole organ of the federal

government in the field of international affairs" but also noting that it, "like every other governmental
power, [it] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution").

Judge Richard Posner reads Curtiss-Wright to mean that the "nation is prior to the Constitution," a
reading which obscures the distinction between our two sovereigns, folding into the word "nation"
both "the People" and the "United States." POSNER, supra note 22, at 4. But he is right to read the

"principle of the case," or at least the principle of Sutherland's dicta, to be "that national power is not
limited to the powers explicitly granted by the Constitution." Id.

130. See A. Kaylvas, supra note 30, at 224-25 (distinguishing sovereignty as command from
sovereignty as constituent power, the latter drawing on George Lawson, John Locke, Thomas Paine,
Emmanuel Siey~s, and Carl Schmitt).
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Since the sovereign is the source of the constitution (as constituent power)
or above the law (through the exception), it is an act of self-contradiction
to be subject to the law. It entails that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts: in Blackstone's maxim, "the king can do no wrong." ''
One way these themes connect to our discussion of contractors is via the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) which Congress enacted in 1946 and
which waived the government's sovereign immunity. 32 The doctrinal
development around the statute-which I will briefly describe-offers one
window into shifting forms of liability, the reach of sovereignty and the
ability of contractors to benefit from immunity. Contextualizing the
statute in an important 1950 case extending the government's immunity,
Justice Jackson wrote in the majority opinion in Feres v. United States that
even though the "political theory that the King could do no wrong was
repudiated in America," the doctrine was "invoked on behalf of the
Republic and applied by our courts as vigorously as it had been on behalf
of the Crown. ' 133 As a result, Jackson continued, as the government
"expanded" its agents have "caused a multiplying number of remediless
wrongs-wrongs which would have been actionable if inflicted by an
individual or a corporation but remediless."' 134 The FTCA was to address
that problem by waiving the federal government's immunity from state
tort litigation "where the United States shall be liable ... in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances . . . .""' The FTCA might be read as a step towards the
United States putting itself in the position of a private actor-by waiving
its sovereign immunity-"privatizing" itself in the sense of making itself
legally vulnerable to other individuals for damages caused them.
The date of the FTCA should be noted: at the same time that the United
States assumed a transcendent degree of sovereign power over life on a
global scale with its acquisition of nuclear weapons, it also waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. But the waiver of immunity for common
law torts did not extend to claims where the United States was acting
131.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES, 238-39 (1966).

("Besides the attribute of

sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, absolute perfection. The king
can do no wrong. Which ancient and fundamental maxim is not to be understood, as if every thing
transacted by the government was of course just and lawful, but means only two things. First, that
whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the king, nor is he
answerable for it personally to his people: for this doctrine would totally destroy the constitutional
independence of the crown, which is necessary to the balance of power. And, secondly, it means that
the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury: it is created for the benefit of the people, and
therefore cannot be exerted to their prejudice"). The full paragraph, which draws on the motif of the
king's two bodies rather than facilitating unrestrained power, seems to cut in exactly the other
direction: if the action was "exceptionable" it was not actually the action of the king.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2005).
133. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 141 (citing 28 U.S.C. 2674); see PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 35-41 (1983).

2009]

Taussig-Rubbo

undeniably like a sovereign and not a "private individual" (in the language
of the FTCA). 3 6 For instance, it provided for a combatant activities
exception- it being the nature of the sovereign at war to be able to incur
injury and death without tort liability.' 37 The 'privatization' of the United
States could only go so far, since there are no actors, as Jackson wrote,
"even remotely analogous" to the United States in the military setting and
he offered as an example that "no private individual has power to
conscript or mobilize a private army . "..."138
Thus, the language of the
statute quoted above-that immunity was waived "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual"-served as a "test"' 39 for
Jackson, one that lead, he found, to a broad exclusion of liability "for
injury to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity to incident to service."' 14 ' This exception to liability went beyond
a narrow view of any specifically military activities and covered a range of
contexts-and according to one author, "essentially reinstated military
immunity" for servicemen seeking to sue the United States. 141
Unable to sue the government, soldiers injured by equipment or services
provided by contractors attempted to sue the contractors. In turn,
contractors sought indemnity from their client, the United States. At first,
in 1977, the Supreme Court rejected that move and left the contractors
exposed to liability. After all, the Court explained in Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States, because the "relationship between the
United States" and the contractor-in that case the manufacturer of a
malfunctioning aircraft ejection system-"is based on a commercial
contract, there is no basis for a claim of unfairness in this result." 142
Indeed, is this not the logic and ethos of commercial law, duly
emphasizing the separate nature of the parties to the transaction? Why
should the government protect and immunize the private contractor?
If the government was not going to immunize contractors, they
presumably would pass on the costs of their exposure to litigation to the
government in the form of higher prices or perhaps simply refuse to sell to
the government. These concerns do not seem unusual-the price of a
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2005) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances...")
137. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (2005) (bars "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"); Imbrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C. 2005) (this "exception seems to represent Congressional acknowledgment
that war is an inherently ugly business for which tort claims are simply inappropriate").
138. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 .
139. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
140. Id. at 146.
141. Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government
Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. CIV.

RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 365, 379 (2006).
142. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977).
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good or service will typically provide for such mark-ups and yet courts
stepped back from this simple logic, which would leave the contractors
liable but able to pass on the cost. Courts were not content to leave these
interactions in the sphere of the market and one worried that "holding the
supplier liable ...would subvert the Feres-Stencel rule" for "despite the
government's immunity [the contractor] would pass the costs of accidents
off to the United States." '43 Why, we might ask, does the normal
operation of the marketplace-in which the buyer is asked to cover the
costs of the product-"subvert" immunity? This seems to be just the point,
that the sovereign is one who can engage in unequal exchanges, who need
not offer compensation, especially so in the context of war. The
background assumption, relevant to our discussion of Blackwater, seems
to be that the services or products provided in war-making would not be
economically viable without sovereign immunity. If one really had to pay
the full costs, there would be no financial incentive to supply the goods or
services. Perhaps it is that this sphere of military activity where the
government relies on an array of private actors resides between a regime
of reciprocity-as in the market contract or the social contract-and a
sovereign regime of unilateral taking (or giving).'4 4
In 1988, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Boyle v. United
Technologies, recalibrated the Court's contractor defense doctrine and
drew on the test developed in the Agent Orange litigation.' 45 Scalia
picked up on the concern about the pass through of costs to the
government. Where there is a unique federal interest, Justice Scalia found,
contractors may be immune when undertaking tasks tailored to the
particular needs of the government and so long as officials are kept
informed.'4 6 Thus the mere purchase of a number of standard helicopters
available in the civilian market would not lead to immunity for the
manufacturer-but where they were designed to meet government
specifications and the government was made aware of dangers, there could
be immunity. The point, for our purposes, is that insofar as the
government is acting like other buyers in the marketplace, there is no need
for immunity. But to the extent that private contractors adapt themselves
to the particular needs of the sovereign-in particular, taking greater
risks-there should be immunity, or else contractors may not have an
143. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984); cited in Kateryna Rakowsky, supra note 14 1, at 381.
144. See Rose, supra note 19, at 315.
145. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
146. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (1988), granted contractors immunity from suit when the government
specified the product requirements; where the contractor met the specifications; and where the
government knew as much or more than the contractor about the product. Boyle found exception to
liability in the "discretionary function" in the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005), not in Feres. See
also Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992) (extension of contractor immunity under
combatant activities exception of FTCA).
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incentive to provide specialized products. Immunity would flow only as a
result of actions and decisions of officials, not contractors.
The doctrinal trajectory of immunity just sketched-the immunity of the
United States, its partial waiver of immunity in the FTCA, and the
disputes over the reach of immunity to contractors-provides an important
background for the Blackwater litigation. It seems to circle around the
insight that the sovereign cannot truly operate in a world where it is
responsible-liable in tort-for the harms it may inflict. It is not clear
how this body of law and doctrine will apply to companies like
Blackwater-and given the removal of the litigation to arbitration, we will
perhaps never know in our particular case. Perhaps to the extent that
Blackwater is not acting independently but is following orders and
specifications provided from the United States, the greater the likelihood
of immunity. For instance, in another contractor case-one arising from
the role of private interrogators and translators at Abu Ghraib and brought
by detainees and their surviving family members-the district court
concluded that that if the contractors "were essentially soldiers in all but in
name," their employers could assert immunity.'47 The employers, now
eager, like Blackwater, to assert that they were not, after all, separate
entities, stated that their employees were on "loan" to the military.' 4 8
In relation to the Fallujah case, there are significant differences between
the contractors and soldiers in terms of supervision and command and
control. In other contexts-such as Blackwater's highly detailed contracts
with the State Department-the differences may not be so stark. But in all
of Blackwater's operations, some of the hallmarks of the soldier status,
such as death for desertion, are simply not present. At least in such a
literal sense of what the "soldier in all but name" test might mean, no
private company could satisfy it. As Justice Jackson noted, no private
party is "even remotely analogous" to the sovereign. 149 But the deeper
paradox may be that the more Blackwater must seek out a "soldier" status
to avoid liability, the greater the collision with the entire ethos of
outsourcing and privatization. To give just one example, the Fallujah
contractors were, according to Blackwater, independent contractors, one
of the most autonomous categories of labor-they are not even under
sufficient control and direction to be "employees," let alone soldiers. But

147. Imbrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing test as composed
of questions such as: "What were their contractual responsibilities? To whom did they report? How
were they supervised? What were the structures of command and control? If they were indeed soldiers
in all but name, the government contractor defense will succeed, but the burden is on defendants to
show that they are entitled to preemption."); see also McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d
1331, 1351 (11 th Cir. 2007) ("[P]rivate contractor agents may be entitled to some form of immunity
that protects their making or executing sensitive military judgments, and that overlaps and possibly
extends beyond the question provided by the political question doctrine.").
148. Imbrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
149. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
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here, as with the contractors' supposed ineligibility for sacrifice, legal
form may be overcome by substance. The form of the relationshipindependent contractor-would probably not stand up to much scrutiny.
They are-at least from a tax perspective-more likely employees.150
Overall, two strong forces seem to be at work: a centrifugal force that
pushes responsibility and liability outwards through contracting and
privatization; and a centripetal force that pulls the sector back towards the
sovereign in order to be immune and remain a viable business model. The
force pulling the contractors back in is related to Justice Scalia's concern
in Boyle that at least certain activities would not be undertaken unless
there was immunity-they could not be sustained in a world of reciprocal
obligations and compensation for harms incurred. The centrifugal force
is-I have argued- tied to an avoidance of sacrifice. In our analysis of
the interaction between sovereignty and sacrifice we saw that soldiers'
deaths were a sacrifice, but the contractors' was officially not. The
soldier's injury generates no legal liability for the government, and neither
does that of contractor-the Fallujah contractors' estates sued Blackwater,
not the United States. That is, the government retains immunity in both
cases, but faces sacrificial liability only with respect to soldiers. But what
we have explored is a possible transformation in these structures.
Contractor sacrifice is slowly being recognized, and the courts are
attempting to discern whether contractor companies merit immunity. Both
seem to orbit around the "soldier"-if they are like soldiers, individuals
killed are more likely to be considered eligible for sacrifice, while their
employers, when responsible for their deaths, are more likely to be
immune. And perhaps there is a logic to this dual movement by which the
contractor sacrifices and their employer is legally immune, that is, that
with sacrifice we are talking about a non-legal liability. This comports
with some of the conceptions of sacrifice we have canvassed: that it is
fundamentally beyond law and in the domain of sovereign action.
B. Re-Enlisting Through the Private Sector
The Fallujah event also reached Congress when the Republican Party
lost its majority in the 2006 mid-term elections and Congressman
Waxman, Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, began to hold hearings on the contractor industry
and Blackwater in particular. In these hearings (one in February 2007 and
another in October 2007), Blackwater took a different stance to the one it
had adopted in court, pointing to the integrity of the judicial process as a

150. See Robert W. Wood, Worker Characterization Lessons From Blackwater, TAX NOTES,
MARCH 3, 2008, at 1010 ("[lt is hard for me to read this contract [Blackwater's 18-page adhesion
contract for its workers] without thinking that the worker is simply required to do what he is told" and
thus is not an independent contractor).

Taussig-Rubbo

20091

reason why Congress should not get involved.'5 1 Indeed, Blackwater
General Counsel Andrew Howell, Esq. urged the committee that it was not
proper and might even be unlawful to inquire into the Fallujah incident
because of the ongoing litigation: "Litigation is conducted according to the
rule of law before an impartial judge or jury hearing direct testimony over
many days from witnesses and experts."' 5 2 In its court papers this was
precisely what Blackwater was seeking to avoid. In later hearings in
October 2007, when Blackwater founder Eric Prince was asked about the
profitability of Blackwater he declined to give figures: "I can give
approximate numbers, but we're a private company. And I'm sure it's the
Congress's main interest in maintaining healthy competition amongst
government vendors.
So we're a private company, and there's a key word
53
there: 'private.""

'

1

Juxtaposing Blackwater's stance in court and before Congress, we see
an actor that seeks both the attributes of sovereignty and the protections of
the private sphere. Prince's appearance before Waxman's committee
came only after the scandal of the Blackwater killing of 17 Iraqi civilians
in Baghdad in September 2007. The rejection of the mercenary label was
emphatic in Prince's testimony, and he emphasized that his company was
doing work requested by the United States and that his employees had
died doing so. Indeed, since many missions consisted of protecting
important U.S. officials-such as the members of Congress questioning
Prince-there was an implicit complaint that he was being attacked by
151. February 2007 hearing, Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and
Status Report (Feb. 7, 2007) Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 10th
Cong. [hereinafter February 7 Hearing]; documents including transcript of hearing available at
http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1165; October 2007 hearing, Blackwater USA: Private
Military Contractor Activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter October 2 Hearing], transcript available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071127131151 .pdf, related
documents
available at
www.oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=l 509.
152. Statement of Andrew Howell, Esq., General Counsel, Blackwater, Dec. 7, 2007, 4
[hereinafter Howell Statement] available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=l 165 and
incorporated into February 7 Hearing at 123-128., 126; in responding to a Congressional investigation
of the Fallujah attack, Blackwater also sought to manipulate some sovereign attributes regarding the
classification of documents. Thus, Blackwater described its position to the House committee which
had sought Blackwater's reports on the Fallujah attack: "We understand the Committee has the
facilities and necessary clearances to hold classified information. As a contractor, however,
Blackwater lacks unilateral authority to provide the Committee with any classified incident reports."
Responses to Questions for the Record, Andrew Howell, General Counsel, Blackwater USA (Feb. 16,
2007). Andrew Howell quoted in MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN

IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER'S ACTIONS IN FALLUJAH 15 (2007), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070927104643.pdf.
In pursing the "classified" reports,
however, the committee discovered that not only were the reports not classified, but that subsequent to
the committee's request Blackwater had hand-delivered copies of its own reports and reports of a
government body to the Department of Defense and requested that they be reviewed for whether they
should be classified. The Defense Department rejected this effort to gain a classified status for
Blackwater's documents, but the effort shows the innovative alignment of public and private that
Blackwater envisions. Id., 14-17.
153. October 2 Hearing at 109 (2007) (Testimony of Eric Prince, chairman and CEO of the
Prince Group, LLC and Blackwater USA).
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those who his company had died protecting. Prince, a clean-cut former
Navy SEAL, insisted that Blackwater was a patriotic American company
in a long lineage of contractors going back to the founding of the
republic.' 54 Blackwater contractors, Prince continued, "have sworn the
oath to support and defend the Constitution" and they "bleed red, white
and blue."' 5 5
In a letter responding to a congressional report on the Fallujah event,
Blackwater wrote that the company "and the veterans who work for
Blackwater, have taken a difficult burden off the shoulders of the
American Armed Forces."' 5 6 Another attempt to dislodge the mercenary
label was to refer to the contractors as veterans and to describe Blackwater
as a place where they simply reenlist: "Military contractors, comprised
largely of military veterans 're-enlisting' through the private sector like
the four Americans killed in Fallujah, fill vital gaps in the all-volunteer
force."' 157 This marvelous locution-re-enlisting through the private
sector-captures well the novel construction of outsourced sacrifice as
both private and sacrificial. Howell, Blackwater's attorney, also made the
explicit point that Congress should not be too critical: "Chances are, if and
when you as Members of Congress and your staffs travel into Iraq, your
lives will be protected for a least part of the trip by Blackwater
professionals."' 5 8 And he supplied testimonials of support such as one
from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (referring to the death of five
Blackwater contractors, saying that "they represent the best of America,
showing valor and courage in the work they did each day"' 5 9) and one
from a State Department spokesperson ("We will always remember their
courage, commitment, and ultimate sacrifice for their country" 6 °).
Indeed, the State Department had become increasingly close to and reliant
on Blackwater since it hired the company to provide for the security of
much of its personnel around the world.
The family members of the killed contractors were also offered an
opportunity to testify before Waxman's committee. 6' They did not
154. Statement Of Erik Prince, Chairman, The Prince Group, LLC And Blackwater USA, in
October2 Hearing at 25, 26.
155. October 2 Hearingat 100.
156. BLACKWATER'S RESPONSE TO 'MAJORITY STAFF REPORT' ON 'PRIVATE MILITARY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER'S ACTIONS IN FALLUJAH I (not dated or
signed; released Oct. 2007).
157. Id.at 10.
158. Howell Statement at I in February 7 Hearing 123.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2, February 7 Hearing at 124 (quoting Scan McCormick).
161. Testimony of Kathryn Helvenston-Wettengel, Rhonda Teague, Donna Zovko, and Kristal
Batalona (Feb. 7,2007), available February 7 Hearingat 76-83, 78. In a jointly issued statement the
family members described a different vision of the company. February 7 Hearing at 77: "Blackwater
gets paid for the number of warm bodies it can put on the ground in certain locations throughout the
world. If some are killed, it replaces them at a moment's notice. What Blackwater fails to realize is
that the commodity it trades in is human life."
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explicitly reject the "mercenary" label, but they noted that the "talents of
highly-skilled special forces personnel do not always translate well into
civilian life."' 6 2 They said that Blackwater told "our men" that they
"would be performing work that would make a difference, such as
guarding Ambassador Paul Bremer, not escorting empty trucks that were
'
going to pick up kitchen equipment."163
Their deaths, we might take this
to mean, should have been sacrifices in the service of an important goal,
but instead were a waste.
The Fallujah event might be understood as the exception proving the
rule that it is possible to construe the contractor as excluded from
sacrifice, and that well-defined legal structures can indeed offer significant
aid to officials seeking to outsource sacrifice and protect themselves from
the political liability that the deaths of U.S. soldiers entails. It seems
extremely fortunate for the contracting sector that this major scandal was
one in which contractors were the victims and not the perpetrators-unlike
the more recent scandal where Blackwater employees killed 17 civilians.
(Although contractors were clearly central to the Abu Ghraib torture story,
which broke shortly after Fallujah, this was not generally framed as being
a contractor scandal.) The most important outcome may be that the
Fallujah event promoted the view that the contractors were not simply
mercenaries. Indeed, in the interpretation I have offered, the attack renationalized the contractors, downplaying the perception of them as selfinterested and representing private values. Blackwater's operations were
not shut down or taken over by the military-on the contrary, they
expanded significantly. The United States, we might speculate, is on the
cusp of both accepting that the contractor's body can be a site of sacrifice
and leaving this potential in the private sector.
We thus return to an outsourcing of sacrifice: the sacrifice is outsourced,
yet it remains sacrifice for a national audience. If what is important about
our language of sacrifice is that it tracks a form of governmental
dependence on the citizenry, the important question is whether seeing the
contractor's death as a sacrifice plays the same role. That is, is this a
sacrifice of the other (as with the substitute) or of the self. If it is a
sacrifice of the other, does this mean that there is no felt connection
between the citizenry and the contractor? If so, then perhaps this language
of sacrifice is not serving to bolster governmental accountability. In fact,
it is perhaps even worse than a scenario in which the contractors' death is
banal since it presents the public with a site of the sacred (say,
Blackwater's memorial at its corporate headquarters) over which the
public has no claim. Rather than having given of itself, the citizenry has
passively received. Talk of sacrifice should attune us to the particular
162.
163.

Id. at3.
Id.at5.

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[21:1

kind of power and prestige generated by giving of the self-which we see
extravagantly displayed in the way that Blackwater asserted itself before
Congress.
C. Sacrificefor Universal Values
We do not see contemporary brigades volunteers going off to fight
for human rights around the world.
Just the opposite: the
independent entrepreneurs of military expertise today are corporate
entities, selling their skills. They are motivated by profit and have no
interest in sacrifice.
-Paul

164
Kahn, Sacred Violence

I have sketched an emergent potential reading of contractors' deaths as
ones addressed to and for the United States. In truth, the industry is not so
limited, and sacrifice can be for more universal concerns. In August 2004,
Blackwater joined an association of military contractor companies called
the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA). 165
The
association's quarterly magazine of January 2006 contains a full-page
advertisement from the company.' 66 On a black background, the words
"Bosnia," "Somalia," "Sudan," "Afghanistan," "Rwanda," and "Iraq"
radiate from a small planet earth in the upper comer of the page. The text
explains:
We live in a world that gets smaller each day. Inescapably, there are
clashes between cultures and value systems. Tragedies that went
unnoticed and undetected 10-20 years ago are daily brought to the
world via network news and the internet. And now that we are aware
of the many travesties of justice in the world, those of us who enjoy
freedom and democracy are now bound to help share it with the
world. Through selfless commitment and compassion for all people,
Blackwater works to make a difference in67the world and provide hope
to those who still live in desperate times.
Positioned as part of a "Peace and Stability Industry," as the head of
IPOA Doug Brooks calls it,' 68 Blackwater declares its devotion to justice,
freedom and democracy. 69 The advertisement does not go quite so far as
70
to employ the term sacrifice, yet "selfless commitment" gets close.

164.

KAHN, supranote 34, at 100.

165. IPOA was founded in April 2001.
166. Blackwater, Advertisement, IPOA QUARTERLY, January 2006, at 4, available at
http://poaonline.org/enjournal/quarterly_2OO6OO203.pdf
167. Id.
168. President's Message, IPOA QUARTERLY, January 2006, [hereinafter President'sMessage] at
2, available at http://ipoaonline.org/en/joumal/quarterly-2006_010203.pdf
169. Id.
170. Blackwater, Advertisement, supra note 166.
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Importantly, the devotion the advertisement articulates is not addressed to
nation or state, but to the principles of justice and to the protection of "all
people."'' Indeed, the lack of a sacrificial bond between state and
contractors can be construed as a positive attribute of the contractor. In
cases where justice demands an intervention but national politicians are
loath to risk their own citizens, the contractor provides a way for states to
promote justice without demanding sacrifice. Perhaps this notion is not
completely hollow in light of the impact of the "Mogadishu effect."
Blackwater, in the advertisement at least, indicates that it will provide the
"selfless commitment"-presumably at times in lieu of citizen armies.
But there is another point to be drawn from this type of language. For
when the advertisement refers to those of "us" who "enjoy freedom and
democracy," and how we are "bound" to "help share it with the world,"
this echoes the enlightened imperial strains of U.S. political discourse.
From this perspective, sacrifice "for" the United States is not for "the
state" so much as it is for the universalizing project which the state
expresses, a project of human freedom, democracy, liberty, etc.
Indeed, this version of U.S. military action as oriented less to the
destruction of an enemy than to the expansion of universal rights is said to
be increasingly visible, even if it is hardly novel in the United States, let
alone in the history of empire.'7 2 The U.S. Navy, to cite one example, was
de-privatized at just the same time that the United States expanded its
imperial ambitions: "Overall," Nicholas Parillo writes, "it seems, the
nation's new imperial ambitions and consequent strategic imperatives not
only banished privateering from the realm of possibility, but also
transformed the Navy itself into a 'not-for-profit' organization."' 73 If we
typically associate national defense with republican virtue and imperialism
with coercive extraction, Parillo suggests a drastically different alignment.
Imperialism in America had to be more humanitarian than simple national
defense.
From this vantage point, sacrifice for the United States becomes
sacrifice not for a nation but for a transcendent global project. Indeed, the
United States becomes the actor willing to suffer for others in order to
provide the basic public good of global security. In its strongest form,
which perfectly inverts narratives of the United States as an exploitative
empire, the globe is seen as covered in the blood of Americans who have
Id.
172. As Ann Stoler remarks, it would be a mistake to see the American "empire" as unique in
imagining itself as beneficent and committed to universal values. Ann Laura Stoler, Degrees of
ImperialSovereignty, PUBLIC CULTURE, vol. 18, issue 1: 125-146, 133 (2006).
173. See Parillo, supra note 96, at 11, 91. ("The New York Times reported that the McKinley
Administration-which was officially justifying the war as a humanitarian mission to rescue Cubans
from Spanish oppression-worried that the captures might put the United States 'in a bad light before
the world' ... [Members of the press] charged that the system tarnished the war's much-touted
humanitarian rationale.").
171.
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died for others. As former Presidential candidate John McCain urged:
"But the fact is, America is the greatest force for good in the history of the
world. My friends, we have gone to all four corners of the Earth and shed
American blood in defense, usually, of somebody else's freedom and our
own."' 17 4 In the same vein, President Bush, when asked on 60 Minutes
whether he owed an apology to the people of Iraq he responded that, on
the contrary, "the Iraqi people owe the American people a huge debt of
gratitude" and most Iraqis "understand that we've endured a great sacrifice
to help them."' 75
Another aspect of this global project is that it is not only U.S. citizencontractors who are dying in its service. Indeed, once the American
project is universalized, there is no conceptual reason why non-U.S.
citizens should not be able to contribute. To cite one recent recognition of
this: in 2008, five Fijian contractors who died in Iraq were awarded the
Defense of Freedom medal. In seven years, the medal specially created to
honor the civilian victims of 9/11 at the Pentagon has migrated to the
South Pacific. The U.S. Embassy representative explained to the Fiji
Times that "the ceremony was to honour the five men who bravely laid
down their lives as part of an international effort to fight terrorism and
create freedom."' 176 In sum, portions of this industry are positioned as
simultaneously patriotic (to the United States) and global, a combination
facilitated by the universal nature of the U.S. project.
However noble their motivations might be, contractors do not, of
course, work for free. The President of IPOA, Doug Brooks, writes that
the "theme for 2006 is 'Beyond Iraq."'' 177 The "bulk of reconstruction
funds have already been spent, and the Coalition will be scaling back its
presence in the country."' 178 Yet "[n]ew opportunities for private firms
continue to expand in international peace operations elsewhere in the
179
world, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Haiti to the Sudan."'
(In October 2007, days after IPOA announced that it would investigate
Blackwater's compliance with IPOA standards, Blackwater withdrew
from the group. 8 0)

174.

Senator John McCain, Address at Second McCain-Obama Debate (Oct. 7, 2008) (transcript

availableat http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/l 0/07/presidential.debate.transcript/).
175. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007).
176. Monica Singh, Local War Casualties Get Medals, Fiji TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2008,

http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=97870 ("US Embassy Charge d'Affairs Jeff Robertson said
the ceremony was to honour the five men who bravely laid down their lives as part of an international
effort to fight terrorism and create freedom.")..
177.
178.
179.

President's Message, supranote 168.
Id.
Id.

180. Press Release, International Peace Operations Association Statement Regarding the
Membership
Status
of
Blackwater
USA
(Oct.
12,
2007)
(on
file
at
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The epigraph to this section quotes Kahn as writing that private military
firms are "motivated by profit and have no interest in sacrifice." '' If we
took a jaundiced-or perhaps simply a realistic-view of contractors'
sacrifice talk, we might dismiss the examples I have produced as mere
advertising and propaganda. To engage with these examples of sacrifice is
to be taken in by a cynical, and transparent, ploy. This may be the right
response, and yet there may be something more interesting and profound
underway. Earlier I described the boundary between old "economistic"
sacrifice and the "new" selfless sacrifice. 18 2 Kahn's conception seems to
tend towards such a dichotomous account as well, insisting on the divide
between political and economic-one cannot sacrifice for the market.
Hubert and Mauss, we saw, did not insist upon a firm dichotomy between
gift, contract and sacrifice-and their framing seems helpful.183 Thus one
way to think of these examples regarding contractors is that they are
tracking a recalibration between the different conceptions of sacrifice,
between economic and political action.
V. THE DISTRIBUTION

OF THE CAPACITY FOR VIOLENCE

In the realm of policy, I regard eliminating the draft as my most
important accomplishment.
-Milton

Friedman

18 4

Legal conscription is only a regularized form of a relationship [the
citizen's availability for sacrifice to the sovereign] that is always an
implied possibility-a background condition of popular sovereignty.
-Paul

Kahn, Sacred Violence"8 5

Perhaps what is troubling about the rise of the contractor is that it
suggests that the government is able to employ force without the bodily
participation of the citizenry (without asking for their "sacrifice"), and is
thereby increasingly autonomous and thereby hewing more to the tradition
and genealogy of governmental sovereignty than popular sovereignty. Is
there anything novel in this development, or is it, rather, simply an old
story and struggle in a new form? This Part first looks at the rise of a
permanent standing army and the advent of nuclear weapons. I draw on
Elaine Scarry's reading of the Founders' understanding that the citizenry,

181. KAHN, supra note 34, at 100.
182. See supra Part I, "The Divine Sovereign."
183. Id.
184. Brian Doherty, Best of Both Worlds: Milton Friedman Reminisces About His Career as an
Economist and His Lifetime "Avocation " as a Spokesman for Freedom, , REASON ONLINE, June 1995,
availableat http://www.reason.com/news/show/29691 .html.
185. KAHN, supra note 34, at 134.
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as a collective, would have greater capacity for violence than the
government. 186 Both nuclear weapons and a standing army undercut the
government's need for ordinary citizens to (actively) participate in
violence. Here, conscription plays an important corrective role (at least in
the example of the Vietnam war) as a mechanism that established a certain
amount of governmental dependence on the citizenry. Scarry suggests a
vision of the mobilized popular sovereign acting together as an ideal type
of decentralized sovereignty.' 8 7 This provides a vantage point from which
to see the permanent standing (volunteer or conscript) army, a post-war
innovation, as itself a kind of outsourcing of sacrifice.
Second, I turn to the termination of conscription in 1973, where military
service was conceived as a matter of taxation, manpower and labor, not
sacrifice, and find, in this transition, a reconceptualization that leads to the
contractor.
In particular, I discuss economist Milton Friedman's
conceptualization of the draft as an in-kind tax that overburdens some
individuals by paying a below market wage. This Part also discerns
different conceptions of sacrifice. In my discussion of Scarry, I mention
Kahn's view of vulnerability to nuclear war as a kind of conscription and a
sacrifice. But I note that this is a rather passive version of sacrifice, of
being sacrificed. In another view of sacrifice, it is an unbalanced
exchange, a taking without compensation. Sacrifice, this is to say, tracks
the "gap" between a market wage and that paid the conscript. This deficit
works in the opposite sense with respect to mercenaries who are, in the
language of international law, motivated by "excess" pay. Here the
disparity can perhaps explain why their deaths are not sacrifices-and,
more interestingly, suggests that sacrifice emerges from an unequal
exchange.
A. The Ideal of the Citizen-Soldier
Elaine Scarry's reading of the U.S. Constitution's Declare War Clause
and the Second Amendment provides an important vantage point into the
tension that has run throughout this Article between governmental
sovereignty and popular sovereignty.' 88 She understands the Second
Amendment to entail a distribution of violence in which the citizenry will
have greater capacity for violence than the government.'89 If the
186. Scarry, supra note 46, at 1269-71.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1308.
189. Id. (writing that the Second Amendment "came into being primarily as a way of dispersing
military power across the entire population"); see also Parillo, supra note 96, at 13 ("[F]ollowing
Jeffersonian ideology, Americans dreaded the advent of a large permanent governmental military as a
threat to democracy, and they considered the small merchant firms and commercial seamen who
engaged in privateering to be less dangerous to the republic than a large navy, since the privateers
inflicted violence in a totally decentralized way, were strategically incapable of acquiring or defending
a European-style global empire, had no permanent stake in war, and could melt back into civil society
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government wants to go to war, it will need the participation of the
citizenry. Part of the Founding generation's aversion to standing armies,
Scarry urges, was that armies upset this distribution and the dependence of
the government. 19° The second piece of Scarry's reading addresses the
power to declare war, vested in Congress in Article I, Section 8. For
Scarry, in order for a declaration to become actual war, it must, because of
the distribution entailed in the Second Amendment, be "substantiated by
the call to arms, in which the proposal either is ratified or refused,
depending on what portion of the population approves of the country's
military participation."' 91 Thus like a constitutional amendment, war
requires going beyond the procedures of normal politics (to use Bruce
Ackerman's phrase)' 9 2-the congressional declaration must be ratified
through popular participation. Without such a distinction between the acts
of representatives and the acts of the people, Scarry's argument could
simply be met by the objection that the normal routes of decision-making
are adequate to protecting the public.
The distribution of the capacity for violence and the steps towards
mobilization which Scarry imagines, are now, of course, unrecognizable.
As John Yoo has reminded us, Presidents routinely take the country to war
without a congressional declaration of war, let alone popular
participation. 9' Even so, viewed not as an empirical claim about our
present day practices but as a normative and originalist assertion, Scarry's
reading of the Second Amendment provides a useful ground to explore
concerns about governmental sovereignty entailed in a standing army and
in nuclear weapons. The significance of a standing army, from this
perspective, is that while Congress is in a position to stop military action
through funding, the default positions which Scarry says the Founders
envisaged are reversed-Congress and the public have de facto consented
in advance, rather than saying yes, they must say no. Extending these
concerns to nuclear weapons, Scarry writes that:
A freestanding missile is the realization of everything that ever was
feared in the standing army. It permits the concentration of a military
when their services were no longer needed. For many Americans, it seems, the clause of the
Constitution authorizing 'letters of marque' had a purpose not unlike that of the Second Amendment,
which guaranteed citizens the right to 'bear arms' in a 'militia' composed of laypersons organized in
local communities, as opposed to professional warriors identified with the central state.") (citations
omitted).
190. Scarry, supra note 46, 1280-83.
191. Id. at 1311.
192. ACKERMAN, supra note 99, at 3-34.
193.

JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AFTER 9/11 (2006) (this is not to credit Yoo's eccentric attempt to ground this 20th century reality in
the original understanding of the Founders, nor to express any satisfaction with his silence on the
impact of the emergence of a standing army for his position); see STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR'S
CAPE: AMERICA'S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO TERROR 290 (2007); see also, John Fabian Witt, Anglo-

American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the Real British Empire Please Stand Up?)
120 HARV. L. REv. 754 (2007).
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force in a central location. It is attached to executive will rather than
to the will of the people. Its structures are permanently in place and
depend little on historical
situations, leaving no room for
1 94
improvisations or debate.
The turn to standing armies and nuclear weapons has disabled or
avoided both Article 1, Section 8 and the Second Amendment, in terms of
Scarry's reading of what they mean. If the citizenry's active consent and
participation is disabled, what are the implications for the concept of
sacrifice (a term which Scarry does not employ)? If by sacrifice we mean
the citizen's voluntary giving of his or her self, then this too would be
disabled. But if we mean a more passive idea of sacrifice, of being
sacrificed, then perhaps the threat of nuclear war represents the
availability of the entire citizenry for sacrifice. This is Kahn's conception
of the matter:
Nuclear weapons are a constant reminder that the state's interests
come first and last, that all individuals-citizens and noncitizens
alike-may be sacrificed to the primacy of the sovereign state. These
weapons rest implicitly on a policy of conscription that extends to
every citizen-and even beyond-for which no exemptions are
granted.1 95
Perhaps the distinction between Scarry and Kahn is simply one between
the actor who offers a sacrifice (Scarry's citizen who consents), and one
who is the offering (Kahn's citizen who is passive and sacrificed by the
state). Of course there is an actor in Kahn's conception-the state, now
acting, to Scarry's dismay, with substantial autonomy from the citizenry.
Kahn would, I think, reject an analysis that pivoted on consent, which, for
him, simply signals the attempt to reduce our analysis to a liberal
framework in which individual consent is the core issue. He writes: "The
ambiguity in the term sacrifice captures the issue exactly: the act of
sacrifice can refer to the self or an other. Sacrifice is both transitive and
intransitive."' 96 This duality or tension in the idea of sacrifice is one that I
have explored in relation to the contractor-whether their deaths are those
of the "self' or of the "other." That said, we can still distinguish different
distributions of sacrifice from one another, and how they change over
time. Thus where Kahn, quite rightly I think, writes that "Legal
conscription is only a regularized form of a relationship that is always an
implied possibility-a background condition of popular sovereignty,"' 97 it
is still important to look at changing distributions of sacrifice, and the
power of competing notions of governmental sovereignty. While it is
194.
195.
196.
197.

Scarry, supra note 46, at 1285.
Kahn, supra note 49, at 355.
KAHN, supra note 34, at 94.
Id. at 134.
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important that Kahn points out the continuity from the Founding to the
present, surely we should also track the discontinuities. The narrative that
Scarry offers about the rise of the standing army suggests that we may
want to distinguish different moments in our changing national tradition of
sacrifice.
In Scarry's discussion of the standing army, a relevant distinction
emerges between a conscript army and a volunteer force. She notes, for
example, that the draft functioned during the Vietnam War to engage the
citizenry-the call to conscription was itself a manifestation of the state's
dependence on the people. Scarry quotes Alexander Bickel:
A democratic state which fights with a conscripted popular army, as
most states like ours have done since the French Revolution, will do
so effectively with difficulty when a large and intense body of
opinion, particularly among those of fighting age, resolutely opposes
the war on moral and political grounds. A conscripted98 army requires
more than a majority political decision to fight a war.'
In attempting to contain presidential war making without congressional
approval, legislators passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973.199
Although Scarry does not make the point, getting rid of the draft, which
Congress did that same year, worked at cross-purposes, if it was the draft
which served as a check on war making. In the War Powers Resolution,
Congress acted to reinforce only one of the lines of consent that Scarry
identifies, its own. In getting rid of the draft and leaving a standing army,
it did not act to reinforce the citizenry's (collective) consent.
Does the emergence of the private military contractor fit into the overall
arc of Scarry's argument, one in which the government increasingly has
access to force without gaining the consent of the citizenry? In one sense,
it clearly does: the use of contractors frees the government from the
burden of finding citizen-volunteers or announcing a draft. We could, that
is, discern a decline in popular sovereignty and a rise of governmental
sovereignty. On the other hand, if Scarry is interested in citizens who
consent, aren't the contractors ideal examples of this? They share certain
features with Scarry's citizen contractors: they are civilians and choose to
participate (unlike the conscript), and their service is based on continuing
consent (it is not enforced by the threat of death, as is the soldier's). On
the other hand, the parallel has an air of the absurd: the contractors do not
represent the people in some collective sense which is Scarry's real
concern.
The position Scarry articulates provides grounds to be skeptical that the
tradition of recognizing military losses as sacrifices could serve to enhance
198.

(1975).
199.

Scarry, supra note 46, at 1261 (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT

War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
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governmental dependence on the citizenry-because doing so coexists
with the very forms of government power (a standing army) she bemoans
and because it can easily be used to drum up nationalistic fervor in which
others, but not oneself, must face danger. Scarry's conception of the
standing army serves to problematize the way in which I have described
the volunteer soldier's death as a sacrifice that binds the government to the
citizenry. Once a force is permanent, it is separated from the everyday life
of the society-think of Huntington's description of West Point amidst the
Babylon of American life."' ° The volunteer soldier in a standing army is
already removed from the citizenry to a degree that undercuts the kind of
governmental dependence Scarry envisions. This is to say that "sacrifice"
seems to have many possible political entailments: for example, it can be
used by citizens to enhance the accountability of government, since it tells
us that a death was not invisible and insignificant; but it can also serve to
render sacred a permanent institution like the military and thereby make it
less vulnerable to critique.
B. From Sacrifice to Tax
The Presidential Commission (known as the Gates Commission) which
paved the way for the transition to an all-volunteer force included amongst
its 15 members economists Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan. 0 l
According to the Gates Commission Report, "conscription is a form of
taxation, and the power to conscript is the power to tax., 2 2 Thus rendered
fungible as monetary payments to the state, military service was not
conceived as a transcendent activity that linked the citizen and sovereign.
The Gates Commission Report offered a different conception of military
service to what we saw in Scarry's account where military service was an
essential part of citizenship:
Any government has essentially two ways of accomplishing an
objective whether it be building an interstate highway system or
raising an army. It can expropriate the required tools and compel
construction men and others to work until the job is finished or it can
purchase the goods and manpower necessary to complete the job.
Under the first alternative, only the persons who own the property
seized or who render compulsory services are required to bear the
expense of building the highway or housing project. They pay a tax
to finance the project, albeit a tax-in-kind. Under the second
alternative, the cost of the necessary goods and services is borne by
the general public through taxes raised to finance the project.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 50, 465-66.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE (1970)
[hereinafter GATES COMMISSION].
202. ELIOT A. COHEN, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS: THE DILEMMAS OF MILITARY SERVICE 167
(1985) (quoting GATES COMMISSION).
200.
201.
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Conscription is like the first alternative-a tax-in-kind. A mixed
force of volunteers and conscripts contains first-term servicemen of
three types-(1) draftees, (2) draft-induced volunteers, and (3) true
volunteers. Draftees and draft-induced volunteers in such a force are
coerced into serving at levels of compensation below what would be
required to induce them to volunteer. They are, in short, underpaid. °3
In this rendition, governmental objectives are not distinguished in kind:
there is no essential difference between building an interstate highway and
raising an army. Rather, two modes of extraction from the population are
noted: a general tax and an in-kind tax. Instead of seeing certain kinds of
activity as non-delegatable, as ones that citizens should perform in their
capacity as citizens-such as voting, serving on juries in the army or the
militia-the issue is framed as one of manpower and labor.
Even so, it is possible to detect something akin to sacrifice in the
quotation from the Gates Commission Report when it describes
conscription, but here it is sacrifice not as the willing giving of the self,
but a predatory taking by the powerful. The draft, the Gates Commission
Report tells us, gets labor at below market rates, and this shortfall in
wages is borne by the conscript-an "in-kind" tax. We saw that the
mercenary is described in international law as motivated by "excess" pay.
In the Gates Commission's analysis of the draft, it is the state that enjoys
an excess, that which it takes but for which it does not pay. While Scarry
described the importance of the government asking for the collective
participation of the citizenry, in the Gates Commission Report we see
another alignment of accountability. By paying a prevailing market wage,
paid for by a general tax, the lines of accountability between the
population and government are strengthened. For now the government
will tax the people collectively, not force the burden-of an "in kind
tax"-onto the individual conscript. This gap between market wage and
the compensation offered the conscript is one way to think of the soldier's
sacrifice. Conscripts "sell at a loss, '"204 to use one dictionary definition of
sacrifice. If we emphasize the coercive dimension, this "sacrifice" is more
a forced sale, a taking, and one without, in the words of the takings clause,
"just compensation. 2 °5
We can appreciate the economists' point in the Gates Commission
Report that the conscripting government is not giving compensation at

203.

GATES COMMISSION, supra note 201, at 23.

204. Merriam-Webster
sacrifice.

Online,

"Sacrifice,"

http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/

205. The Takings Clause provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For discussion of the draft as a taking, see William A.
Fischel, The PoliticalEconomy of Just Compensation: Lessonsfrom the Military Draft for the Takings

Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 24 (1996) ("The military draft was a taking of property-men's
property in their own labor-with much less than full compensation."). See also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 481 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing conscription as a tax).
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prevailing wage rates. Yet this seems to overlook the way in which the
tradition of recognizing the soldier's loss as a sacrifice is a form of
compensation, one that may, from the perspective of officials, seem even
more burdensome than paying the prevailing wage. That is, the soldier is
offered compensation for the shortfall the Gates Commission identifiesin the form of public recognition, medals, honors, and what we have
generally encountered as the sacrificial tradition.
Whether this
compensation is a mirage, or whether it pushes the soldier into a
transcendent realm of martyrdom and national sainthood, is a question that
has been answered in different ways and is certainly deeply grounded in
the specifics of any given conflict. For example, the history of the Purple
Heart medal illuminates the tension between "real" monetary
compensation and other forms of payment. The "original" Purple Heart
created by General Washington was a Badge of Military Merit that he
announced in his General Orders of August 7, 1782, after being informed
by the Continental Congress to stop his practice of giving commissions or
promotions, since the Congress could not afford the extra pay these
entailed. Instead of a reward with a monetary cost, then, Washington
devised his award made of purple cloth, which was later reinvented in
1932 as the Purple Heart. 0 6 In this story, Washington invented the honor
as a substitute for promotions and pay increases, an account that reiterates
basic questions about whether the honoring we see in the granting of
medals and in the calling a loss a sacrifice is really just a ruse, a bad deal,
a trinket dressed up as the sacred. In this Purple Heart story it comes in
lieu of "real" compensation. Of course, that is the cynical or secular
interpretation, and surely one that many would find offensive since it fails
to see in the medal a symbol of transcendent loss. But perhaps it is the
inadequacy of the item given (say the cloth or metal), in relation to the
service rendered (say the value of life or injury as calculated in tort law),
that is essential to sacrifice. The individual is linked to a larger collectivity
by the very fact that they have not received "fair" compensation. It is just
this "debt" or imbalance which links individual and the larger entity,
turning an exchange relation into a relation of incorporation. Put another
way, we might think of a sacrifice as intrinsically an unequal exchange, a
perspective that suggests why we are often so worried that it may simply
be a trick or a larceny.
If the volunteer soldier is paid a market rate, does this undercut the
notion that they sacrifice? That is, if the volunteer is paid a market wage,
perhaps they have already been compensated for their loss. There is no
need to add on the additional layer of sacrificial compensation. There
206. See www.purpleheart.org/Membership/Public/ AboutUs/HistoryMedal.aspx. For discussion
of awards, coins in particular, given by commanders to soldiers, see Major Kathryn R. Sommerkamp,
Commander's Coins: Worth Their Weight in Gold? 26 ARMY LAWYER 6,9 (1997).
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would be neither a shortfall (on the part of the individual) nor an excess
(on the part of the state) that demands some additional recognition and
honoring. The two parties have made a fair bargain. Thus, from this
perspective, it is the conscript who sacrifices (or is sacrificed) while the
volunteer does not sacrifice. More to the point, and more disturbingly,
from this perspective, the volunteer looks much like the private military
contractor. Indeed, both Scarry and the Gates Commission Report
problematize the notion that the volunteer standing army sacrifices.
The reference to "excess compensation" in the Geneva Convention
definition of the mercenary is relevant to this discussion---even if the
contractors are generally not "mercenaries" in a strict legal sense. °7 This
"excess" requirement was intended to "distinguish a mercenary from a
volunteer who, motivated by his ideals, accepts the usual or ordinary
conditions of pay of the other soldiers, and also to distinguish a mercenary
from other members of the regular armed forces." ' What are we to make
of the notion of excess compensation? From the point of view of the
Gates Commission, it seems fair to suppose, there is nothing "excess" in
what the contractors are paid-by definition, they are paid a market rate,
and hence their pay is not excess in relation to that baseline. The excess,
as the Protocol explains, is in relation to the soldier. If that happens to be
a conscript, then, according to the Gates Commission, they are likely
underpaid and the "excess" pay is simply what is necessary to meet the
fair market price. But if the baseline if the volunteer soldier, then the
comparison to the contractor is more difficult since both of these are
consenting. We seem to have various interpretative options: the volunteer
is paid a fair market rate and the contractor is "overpaid," and thus instead
of fair exchange or a sacrifice in relation with the contractor we have
something closer to a larceny of the taxpayer; or if we for some reason
think that the volunteer is underpaid (for example, that the government is
taking advantage of vulnerable young people in recruiting them and
underpaying them) then perhaps the contractor is not paid an excess
amount. In addition to thinking about monetary compensation, we should
reflect on the other part of the Convention's definition, the mercenary's
"motivation." It is not just a dollar amount, but that they act for their own
benefit, they do not "give" themselves to the larger project. And this
failure to give the self is, as noted, a critical legal difference: the
contractor can withdraw their consent at any time while the soldier's
207. See Protocol I, supra note 52, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument
(listing criteria under Protocol I).
208.

Marie France Major, Mercenaries and InternationalLaw, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 103,

108-09 ("However, no consensus could be reached in 1976 on a definition of 'mercenary.' The reason
for this stalemate was a divergence of approaches between the Third World countries who wanted a
wide, all-encompassing definition (since they are the ones who must endure the activities of
mercenaries) and Western states who were pushing for a narrow definition (because they are the main
suppliers of mercenaries)").
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consent is (at least for a period of years) irrevocable.
We have encountered at least two interpretations of the way
conscription relates to accountability: for Scarry, (reflecting on the
Vietnam war) it preserves the government's reliance on the people; for the
Gates Commission Report, it avoids the government's reliance on the
consent of the citizenry, since it employs coercion. These two perspectives
focus on different issues. Scarry is concerned with a notion of collective
consent (that "the People" have authorized military action acting directly,
not through their representatives or the channels of normal politics). The
Gates Commission Report focuses on individual consent from the
volunteer and the shared burden of more equitable taxation in the absence
of the "in-kind" tax. Both give reason to reconsider whether the volunteer
in a standing army should be seen to "sacrifice."
Thinking through these larger frameworks helps deepen our
understanding of how we should proceed with respect to contractors.
Even Congressman Waxman, who has led the inquiries into Blackwater,
seems to accept the essential fungbility of military activity with other
types of government action. In his opening remarks at the hearings on
Blackwater, he framed his approach as one concerned with cost and
benefit, narrowly construed:
If Blackwater and other companies are really providing better service
at lower cost, the experiment of privatizing is working. But if the
costs are higher and performance is worse, then I don't understand
why we are doing this. It makes no sense to pay more for less. We
will examine this issue today and facts, not ideology, need to guide us
here.20 9
This framing of the issue is important, but we might pause at Waxman's
dismissal of "ideology." For while he probably had in mind an ideology
that insisted that privatization was per se beneficial, he neglects to
mention the sacrificial tradition. This tradition brings with it a much more
complex idea of cost and benefit than what the Congressman seems to
have in mind.
Long after his participation on the Gates Commission, in a book he
wrote with his wife Rose, Milton Friedman recalled a memorable
interchange during the Gates Commission's hearings with General
Westmoreland:
In the course of his testimony [against an all volunteer force], he
made the statement that he did not want to command an army of
mercenaries. I stopped him and said, 'General, would you rather
command an army of slaves?' He drew himself up and said, 'I don't
like to hear our patriotic draftees referred to as slaves.' I replied, 'I
209. October 2 Hearing, supra note 151, at 3 (statement of Rep. Waxman, Chairman, House
Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform).
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don't like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred to as mercenaries.'
But I went on to say, 'If they are mercenaries, then I, sir, am a
mercenary professor, and you, sir, are a mercenary general; we are
served by mercenary physicians, we use a mercenary lawyer, and we
get our meat from a mercenary butcher.' 2 1That
was the last that we
0
mercenaries.
about
general
the
from
heard
This passage recapitulates much of our discussion. Justice Taney, we saw,
explained that the slave formed "no part of the sovereignty of the State,
and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it."'211 Friedman offers

the inverse reading. Rather than a high, sacred calling, (compulsory)
military service is, rather, slavery. 12 This is another way of thinking of
the meaning of the uncompensated taking which the Gates Commission
found inherent in conscription. The conscript is one whose body and labor
is made use of by another (indeed, this "slave" of the state may be cheaper
to acquire than an actual slave whose owner must be paid).2 13 This
intimation of a duality of slavery and sacrifice-in both the individual
becomes a vehicle for another person or idea-is revealing, through both
we leave the liberal world of self-ownership. But one offers a kind of
sainthood, the other degradation.
Westmoreland, in Friedman's recounting, sees the relations in yet
another way. He saw the volunteers as mercenaries, in contrast to patriotic
draftees. Their patriotism is ensured, presumably, by the fact that one can
be sure that the draftee has no hidden motive for joining since they do not
join, but are made to join. By pointing out that there was self-interest to
be found in all occupations-Friedman's examples echoing Adam Smith's
famous lines 214 Friedman writes that he managed to cut off the argument
that volunteer soldiers would lack the proper motivation. Or, put another
210. David Henderson, The Role of Economists in Ending the Draft, vol. 2 ECON. J.WATCH No.
2, 362-76, 370 (2005) (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, Two LUCKY PEOPLE 380
(1998)).
211.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 415.
212. The Supreme Court, incidentally, had long before rejected any notion that the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude barred conscription. Arver v. US, 245 U.S. 366, 390
(1918) ("[W]e are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen
of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and
honor of the nation as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people can be
said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth
Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its
mere statement.").
213. Fischel, supra note 205, at 30 ("Judah Benjamin, Secretary of State for the Confederacy,
seriously contemplated the use of slaves to shore up the ranks. He soon realized, however, that this
was financially infeasible. Slaves could be hired for military service from their masters, but the going
rate for slaves (paid to their masters, of course) was $30 per month, while Confederate soldiers were
paid only $11 per month. It is reasonable to conclude that had slaves been subject to the military draft,
more of them would have been employed by the military. As it was, slaves' status as property
protected their lives, at least from battle deaths") (internal citations omitted).
214. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Bk. 1, Ch. 2-3 (1901) ("It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest.").
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way, Friedman insisted that we all lack the proper motivation, and that it is
naive to expect anything but a mercenary attitude.
Yet the notion that volunteer soldiers are mercenaries does not grasp our
perceptions of the military. Even though the benefits of military service to
the individual (bonuses, health care, education) are openly acknowledged,
"sacrifice" remains central to American conceptions of military service.
The volunteer soldier is neither categorically divorced from self-interest
nor purely altruistic: we suppose some intermingling of various factors,
just as Mauss supposed was usually the case with any sacrifice.
Thus Friedman and the Gates Commission can be seen as at once
articulating a powerful perspective, but one which has not fully carried the
day. In our current situation, we have a particular composite: a volunteer,
standing army whose losses we call sacrifices. This configuration
combines various threats. If we credit Scarry, there is a danger in the
existence of a standing army; and the absence of coercion in the draft
disables another form of accountability. I have emphasized that calling
the soldier's death a sacrifice serves as a kind of liability for officials, and
I linked it to a tradition of popular sovereignty. But we have developed an
alternate reading: that calling military losses sacrifices could serve to
increase the military's prestige and simply reinforce the dependence
already institutionalized in a standing army. In the broad sense I have
used the term, this would lend weight to governmental sovereignty.
Friedman's line of thinking, according to which military service was
above all a labor and manpower issue to be addressed in the marketplace,
effortlessly leads to our current dilemma with the contractor. We have
seen that one plausible interpretation of the contractor is as ineligible for
sacrifice. But we have also seen that this categorization is not stable, that
there is recurrent reference by contractors and officials to "sacrifice." We
confront, in the body of the contractor, a fusion of contract and sacrifice,
an overcoming of a dichotomous conceptualization of the two
transactional forms. This poses the same dangers just noted in our
tradition of calling soldiers' deaths sacrifices. Rather than bolstering
popular sovereignty, calling the contractors' deaths sacrifices could serve
to reinforce the people's understanding of themselves as disarmed and
passive-and thereby sound more in the tradition of governmental
sovereignty or what we might call corporate sovereignty.
CONCLUSION

Rather than foregrounding the legal liability of private military
contractors and their employers, this Article has addressed the sacrificial
liability of the U.S. government. Having described the traditional
structure linking sacrifice and citizenship in the United States, I asked
what the contractor's relationship was to this tradition and found that it
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was one of exclusion. However, among contractors, and even among
high-level officials, there is some recognition, albeit informal and ad hoc,
that contractors' deaths can be considered "sacrifices."
This was
especially evident when contractors were U.S. citizens, although I offered
a few examples of how this recognition extended to contractors from other
parts of the world, such as Fiji. These were sacrifices to or for a range of
entities and ideas: the client, the country, freedom, or the war on terror.
In the examination of one noteworthy case, the killing of four armed
U.S. citizen contractors in Fallujah, I urged that the U.S. reception of that
event could be seen in relation to a concept of popular sovereignty. This
conceptualization of sovereignty designates ordinary citizens as latent
vehicles for or of the sovereign-even though "the People" are ephemeral,
their attackers targeted them as relating to the collectivity and thereby
summoned it for an American audience, illuminating the latent potential of
the part (the citizen) to stand in for the larger whole (the sovereign). The
designation "independent contractor" was overwhelmed by the status of
"American" and "citizen." I turned to this analysis in an effort to grasp
why it was that the legal relation of "independent contractor" was not
adequate to grasping the event, and why it was that the contractors' deaths
could not or would not remain banal and insignificant to the U.S.
I then examined the contractors' employer, Blackwater, in its attempts
to assert sovereign immunity from the litigation commenced by the
contractors' families. The status of governmental sovereign promised a
position of no legal liability-and thus in the context of my narrative,
served precisely the opposite ends of the relation between part and whole
in relation to the popular sovereign. It served to ensure that the sovereign
would not be liable to citizens-since an essential feature of the relation is
one in which the sovereign-at war-can ask for life and cause death.
Two strong forces seem to be at work: a centrifugal force that pushes
responsibility and liability outwards through contracting and privatization;
and a centripetal force that pulls the privatized sector back towards the
sovereign in order to be immune and remain a viable business model.
Were the contractor companies successful in their arguments-which thus
far they have not been-and were contractors' deaths not considered
sacrifices, we would see a new alignment, one in which the government
had neither sacrificial liability nor legal liability for those who die
undertaking work on its behalf.
The emergent and largely informal recognition of sacrifice I describe
raises an obvious question: should contractors be officially included in the
tradition of national sacrifice? Should they be given Purple Hearts and
buried at Arlington? If contractors are to act on behalf of the sovereign-if they are to kill or be killed in the interests of the United States-perhaps
their deaths should be recognized as sacrifices. Or, if our concern is only
the discrepancy between the recognition offered soldiers and contractors,
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both could be leveled downwards. To the extent we share Scarry's
concern about a standing army, and to the extent we are skeptical that
seeing their losses as sacrifices actually furthers the goal of governmental
accountability, perhaps we should not honor either. Both contractors and
soldiers, from this radical viewpoint, can be seen as examples of an
outsourcing of the duties of the citizen-soldier. Calling contractors' deaths
sacrifices would increase the prestige of contractors, perhaps definitively
freeing them of the mercenary stigma. If the goal of granting such
recognition is to duplicate the costs which officials confront when soldiers
die carrying out national policy, it is not clear that this would happen. The
likely problem is that the citizenry would not see the contractors' deaths as
relating to themselves, and thus the deaths would not trigger them to ask
their representatives for an accounting of why the loss (the sacrifice) was
justifiable. Indeed, it seems plausible that such a policy would have the
opposite outcome by offering a vision of government as ever more
autonomous and present the public with private sacred sites-such as that
at the Blackwater headquarters-over which they have little claim.
The specter of a government which engages in violence but avoids
sacrificial meaning has been raised by Giorgio Agamben in his book
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.2 15 He urges that sovereign
power describes the actor who/which can kill without committing a
sacrifice or a homicide. Sovereignty exists in a double exception from
human law and divine law. Drawing on the work of Paul Kahn, my
analysis has supposed a different point of departure: that sacrifice and
sovereignty are deeply intertwined. In the United States, the link seems to
have been critical to the understanding of citizenship and of slavery. At
the core of my analysis, then, is an entirely different point than that which
Agamben advances: the enormous difficulty and, in the instance of the
Fallujah incident, the failure of the attempt to construct the actor who is
unsacrificeable.
And yet our examination of the attempt to outsource sacrifice provides a
point of contact with Agamben; it is precisely in order to avoid the fact
that the deaths of soldiers are considered to be sacrifices that the
contractor seems to have emerged. It is the contractor whom law and
policy attempts to designate as one whose death is not a sacrifice.
Perhaps, then, we see the United States attempting to become a sovereign
in Agamben's sense, attempting to shed this layer of liability.
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AGAMBEN, supra note 38, at 83.

